Instrumental Variables: Then and Now

James Heckman
University of Chicago
and
University College Dublin

Econometric Policy Evaluation, Lecture II
Koopmans Memorial Lectures
Cowles Foundation
Yale University
September 27, 2006
This lecture based on

Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006)

“Understanding Instrumental Variables in Models With Essential Heterogeneity”
Policy adoption problem

- Suppose a policy is proposed for adoption in a country.
- What can we conclude about the likely effectiveness of the policy in countries?
- Build a model of counterfactuals.

\[ Y_1 = \mu_1(X) + U_1 \]  
\[ Y_0 = \mu_0(X) + U_0. \]
Policy adoption problem

Suppose a policy is proposed for adoption in a country.

What can we conclude about the likely effectiveness of the policy in countries?

Build a model of counterfactuals.

\[ Y_1 = \mu_1(X) + U_1 \]
\[ Y_0 = \mu_0(X) + U_0. \]
Suppose a policy is proposed for adoption in a country.

What can we conclude about the likely effectiveness of the policy in countries?

Build a model of counterfactuals.

\[ Y_1 = \mu_1(X) + U_1 \]
\[ Y_0 = \mu_0(X) + U_0. \]
Consider the basic generalized Roy model

- Two potential outcomes \((Y_0, Y_1)\).
- A choice equation

\[
D = 1[\mu_D(Z, V) > 0].
\]

- Observed outcomes are

\[
Y = DY_1 + (1 - D)Y_0
\]

- Assume \(\mu_D(Z, V) = \mu_D(Z) - V\).
Consider the basic generalized Roy model

- Two potential outcomes \((Y_0, Y_1)\).
- A choice equation

\[
D = 1[\mu_D(Z, V) > 0].
\]

- Observed outcomes are

\[
Y = DY_1 + (1 - D)Y_0
\]

- Assume \(\mu_D(Z, V) = \mu_D(Z) - V\).
Consider the basic generalized Roy model

- Two potential outcomes \((Y_0, Y_1)\).
- A choice equation

\[
D = 1[\mu_D(Z, V) > 0].
\]

- Observed outcomes are

\[
Y = DY_1 + (1 - D)Y_0
\]

- Assume \(\mu_D(Z, V) = \mu_D(Z) - V\).
Consider the basic generalized Roy model

- Two potential outcomes \((Y_0, Y_1)\).
- A choice equation

\[
D = 1[\mu_D(Z, V) > 0].
\]

net utility

- Observed outcomes are

\[
Y = DY_1 + (1 - D)Y_0
\]

- Assume \(\mu_D(Z, V) = \mu_D(Z) - V\).
Switching Regression Notation

\[
Y = Y_0 + (Y_1 - Y_0)D \\
= \mu_0 + (\mu_1 - \mu_0 + U_1 - U_0)D + U_0.
\]

(Quandt, 1958, 1972)

In Conventional Regression Notation

\[
Y = \alpha + \beta D + \varepsilon
\]

\[
\alpha = \mu_0, \quad \beta = (Y_1 - Y_0) = \mu_1 - \mu_0 + U_1 - U_0, \quad \varepsilon = U_0.
\]

\[
\beta \text{ is the “treatment effect.”}
\]
Figure 1: distribution of gains, a Roy economy

\[ \beta = Y_1 - Y_0 \]

TT = 2.666, TUT = -0.632

Return to Marginal Agent = C = 1.5, ATE = \( \mu_1 - \mu_0 = \bar{\beta} = 0.2 \)
# The model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Choice Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| \( Y_1 = \mu_1 + U_1 = \alpha + \bar{\beta} + U_1 \) | \( D = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } D^* > 0 \\
0 & \text{if } D^* \leq 0 
\end{cases} \) |
| \( Y_0 = \mu_0 + U_0 = \alpha + U_0 \) |

---

**General Case**

\( (U_1 - U_0) \not\sim D \)

\( \text{ATE} \neq \text{TT} \neq \text{TUT} \)
The model

The Researcher Observes \((Y, D, C)\)

\[
Y = \alpha + \beta D + U_0 \quad \text{where} \quad \beta = Y_1 - Y_0
\]

Parameterization

\[
\begin{align*}
\alpha &= 0.67 \quad (U_1, U_0) \sim N(0, \Sigma) \\
\bar{\beta} &= 0.2 \quad \Sigma = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & -0.9 \\ -0.9 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\
D^* &= Y_1 - Y_0 - C \\
C &= 1.5
\end{align*}
\]
In the case when $U_1 = U_0 = \varepsilon_0$, simple least squares regression of $Y$ on $D$ subject to a selection bias.

This is a form of endogeneity bias considered by the Cowles analysts.

Upward biased for $\beta$ if $\text{Cov}(D, \varepsilon) > 0$. 
In the case when $U_1 = U_0 = \varepsilon_0$, simple least squares regression of $Y$ on $D$ subject to a selection bias.

This is a form of endogeneity bias considered by the Cowles analysts.

Upward biased for $\beta$ if $\text{Cov}(D, \varepsilon) > 0$.  

In the case when $U_1 = U_0 = \varepsilon_0$, simple least squares regression of $Y$ on $D$ subject to a **selection bias**.

This is a form of endogeneity bias considered by the Cowles analysts.

Upward biased for $\beta$ if $\text{Cov}(D, \varepsilon) > 0$. 

Three main approaches have been adopted to solve this problem:

1. Selection models
2. Instrumental variable models
3. Matching: assumes that \( \epsilon \perp \perp D \mid X \).

Matching is just nonparametric least squares and assumes access to rich data which happens to guarantee this condition.
Three main approaches have been adopted to solve this problem:

1. Selection models
2. Instrumental variable models
3. Matching: assumes that $\varepsilon \perp \perp D \mid X$.

Matching is just nonparametric least squares and assumes access to rich data which happens to guarantee this condition.
Three main approaches have been adopted to solve this problem:

1. Selection models
2. Instrumental variable models
3. Matching: assumes that $\varepsilon \perp D \mid X$.

Matching is just nonparametric least squares and assumes access to rich data which happens to guarantee this condition.
Three main approaches have been adopted to solve this problem:

1. Selection models
2. Instrumental variable models
3. Matching: assumes that $\epsilon \perp \perp D \mid X$.

Matching is just nonparametric least squares and assumes access to rich data which happens to guarantee this condition.
Three main approaches have been adopted to solve this problem:

1. Selection models
2. Instrumental variable models
3. Matching: assumes that $\varepsilon \perp \perp D \mid X$.

Matching is just nonparametric least squares and assumes access to rich data which happens to guarantee this condition.
Case I, the traditional case: $\beta$ is a constant

- If there is an instrument $Z$, with the property that

  \[
  \text{Cov}(Z, D) \neq 0 \quad (1.4)
  \]
  \[
  \text{Cov}(Z, \varepsilon) = 0, \quad (1.5)
  \]

  then

  \[
  \text{plim} \ \hat{\beta}_{\text{IV}} = \frac{\text{Cov}(Z, Y)}{\text{Cov}(Z, D)} = \beta.
  \]

- If other instruments exist, each identifies the same $\beta$. 
Case I, the traditional case: $\beta$ is a constant

- If there is an instrument $Z$, with the property that
  
  $$\text{Cov}(Z, D) \neq 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (1.4) \\
  $$\text{Cov}(Z, \varepsilon) = 0,$$  \hspace{1cm} (1.5)

  then

  $$\text{plim} \ \hat{\beta}_{IV} = \frac{\text{Cov}(Z, Y)}{\text{Cov}(Z, D)} = \beta.$$ 

- If other instruments exist, each identifies the same $\beta$. 
Case II, heterogeneous response case: $\beta$ is a random variable even conditioning on $X$

**Sorting bias** or sorting on the gain which is distinct from sorting on the level.

**Essential heterogeneity**

$$\text{Cov}(\beta, D) \neq 0.$$ 

Suppose (1.4), (1.5) and

$$\text{Cov}(Z, \beta) = 0. \quad (1.6)$$

• Can we identify the mean of $(Y_1 - Y_0)$ using IV?
In general we cannot (Heckman and Robb, 1985).

Let

\[ \bar{\beta} = (\mu_1 - \mu_0) \]

\[ \beta = \bar{\beta} + \eta \]

\[ U_1 - U_0 = \eta \]

\[ Y = \alpha + \bar{\beta}D + [\epsilon + \eta D] . \]

Need \( Z \) to be uncorrelated with \([\epsilon + \eta D]\) to use IV to identify \( \bar{\beta} \).

This condition will be satisfied if policy adoption is made without knowledge of \( \eta (= U_1 - U_0) \).

If decisions about \( D \) are made with partial or full knowledge of \( \eta \), IV does not identify \( \bar{\beta} \).
In general we cannot (Heckman and Robb, 1985).

Let

\[ \bar{\beta} = (\mu_1 - \mu_0) \]
\[ \beta = \bar{\beta} + \eta \]
\[ U_1 - U_0 = \eta \]
\[ Y = \alpha + \bar{\beta}D + [\varepsilon + \eta D]. \]

Need \( Z \) to be uncorrelated with \( [\varepsilon + \eta D] \) to use IV to identify \( \bar{\beta} \).

This condition will be satisfied if policy adoption is made without knowledge of \( \eta (= U_1 - U_0) \).

If decisions about \( D \) are made with partial or full knowledge of \( \eta \), IV does not identify \( \bar{\beta} \).
In general we cannot (Heckman and Robb, 1985).

Let

\[ \bar{\beta} = (\mu_1 - \mu_0) \]
\[ \beta = \bar{\beta} + \eta \]
\[ U_1 - U_0 = \eta \]
\[ Y = \alpha + \bar{\beta}D + [\varepsilon + \eta D]. \]

Need \( Z \) to be uncorrelated with \( [\varepsilon + \eta D] \) to use IV to identify \( \bar{\beta} \).

This condition will be satisfied if policy adoption is made without knowledge of \( \eta (= U_1 - U_0) \).

If decisions about \( D \) are made with partial or full knowledge of \( \eta \), IV does not identify \( \bar{\beta} \).
In general we cannot (Heckman and Robb, 1985).

Let

\[ \bar{\beta} = (\mu_1 - \mu_0) \]
\[ \beta = \bar{\beta} + \eta \]
\[ U_1 - U_0 = \eta \]
\[ Y = \alpha + \bar{\beta}D + [\varepsilon + \eta D] \].

Need \( Z \) to be uncorrelated with \( [\varepsilon + \eta D] \) to use IV to identify \( \bar{\beta} \).

This condition will be satisfied if policy adoption is made without knowledge of \( \eta (= U_1 - U_0) \).

If decisions about \( D \) are made with partial or full knowledge of \( \eta \), IV does not identify \( \bar{\beta} \).
In general we cannot (Heckman and Robb, 1985).

Let

\[ \bar{\beta} = (\mu_1 - \mu_0) \]
\[ \beta = \bar{\beta} + \eta \]
\[ U_1 - U_0 = \eta \]
\[ Y = \alpha + \bar{\beta}D + [\varepsilon + \eta D] . \]

Need \( Z \) to be uncorrelated with \([\varepsilon + \eta D]\) to use IV to identify \( \bar{\beta} \).

This condition will be satisfied if policy adoption is made without knowledge of \( \eta (= U_1 - U_0) \).

If decisions about \( D \) are made with partial or full knowledge of \( \eta \), IV does not identify \( \bar{\beta} \).
The IV condition is

\[ E[\varepsilon + \eta D \mid Z] = 0. \]

- \( E(\varepsilon \mid Z) = 0, \quad E(\eta \mid Z) = 0. \)
- Even if \( \eta \perp\!\!\!\!\perp Z, \eta \not\perp\!\!\!\!\perp Z \mid D = 1. \)
- \( E(\eta D \mid Z) = E(\eta \mid D = 1, Z) \Pr(D = 1 \mid Z). \)
- But \( E(\eta \mid Z, D = 1) \neq 0, \) in general, if agents have some information about the gains.
The IV condition is

$$E[\varepsilon + \eta D \mid Z] = 0.$$  

$$E(\varepsilon \mid Z) = 0, \quad E(\eta \mid Z) = 0.$$  

Even if $$\eta \perp \perp Z, \eta \not\perp \perp Z \mid D = 1.$$  

$$E(\eta D \mid Z) = E(\eta \mid D = 1, Z) \Pr(D = 1 \mid Z).$$  

But $$E(\eta \mid Z, D = 1) \neq 0,$$ in general, if agents have some information about the gains.
The IV condition is

\[ E [\varepsilon + \eta D \mid Z] = 0. \]

- \( E (\varepsilon \mid Z) = 0, \quad E (\eta \mid Z) = 0. \)

- Even if \( \eta \perp Z, \quad \eta \not\perp Z \mid D = 1. \)

- \( E(\eta D \mid Z) = E(\eta \mid D = 1, Z) \Pr(D = 1 \mid Z). \)

- But \( E (\eta \mid Z, D = 1) \neq 0, \) in general, if agents have some information about the gains.
The IV condition is

$$E [\varepsilon + \eta D | Z] = 0.$$  

$$E (\varepsilon | Z) = 0, \quad E (\eta | Z) = 0.$$  

Even if $$\eta \perp Z, \eta \not\perp Z | D = 1.$$  

$$E(\eta D | Z) = E(\eta | D = 1, Z) \Pr(D = 1 | Z).$$  

But $$E (\eta | Z, D = 1) \neq 0,$$ in general, if agents have some information about the gains.
The IV condition is

\[ E[\varepsilon + \eta D \mid Z] = 0. \]

\[ E(\varepsilon \mid Z) = 0, \quad E(\eta \mid Z) = 0. \]

Even if \( \eta \perp \perp Z, \eta \not\perp Z \mid D = 1. \)

\[ E(\eta D \mid Z) = E(\eta \mid D = 1, Z) \Pr(D = 1 \mid Z). \]

But \( E(\eta \mid Z, D = 1) \neq 0, \) in general, if agents have some information about the gains.
Draft Lottery example (Heckman, 1997).

- Linear IV does not identify ATE or any standard treatment parameters.
• Draft Lottery example (Heckman, 1997).

• Linear IV does not identify ATE or any standard treatment parameters.
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- Imbens and Angrist (1994) establish that IV can identify an interpretable parameter in the model with essential heterogeneity.

- Their parameter is a discrete approximation to the marginal gain parameter of Björklund and Moffitt (1987).

- This parameter can be interpreted as the marginal gain to outcomes induced from a marginal change in the costs of participating in treatment (Björklund-Moffitt).
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- Imbens and Angrist (1994) establish that IV can identify an interpretable parameter in the model with essential heterogeneity.

- Their parameter is a discrete approximation to the marginal gain parameter of Björklund and Moffitt (1987).

- This parameter can be interpreted as the marginal gain to outcomes induced from a marginal change in the costs of participating in treatment (Björklund-Moffitt).
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- Imbens and Angrist (1994) establish that IV can identify an interpretable parameter in the model with essential heterogeneity.

- Their parameter is a discrete approximation to the marginal gain parameter of Björklund and Moffitt (1987).

- This parameter can be interpreted as the marginal gain to outcomes induced from a marginal change in the costs of participating in treatment (Björklund-Moffitt).
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- Imbens and Angrist assume the existence of an instrument $Z$ that takes two or more distinct values.
- Keep conditioning on $X$ implicit.
- Let $D_i(z)$ be the indicator ($= 1$ if adopted; $= 0$ if not).
- It is a random variable for choice when we set $Z = z$. 
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- Imbens and Angrist assume the existence of an instrument $Z$ that takes two or more distinct values.
- Keep conditioning on $X$ implicit.
- Let $D_i(z)$ be the indicator ($= 1$ if adopted; $= 0$ if not)
- It is a random variable for choice when we set $Z = z$. 
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- Imbens and Angrist assume the existence of an instrument $Z$ that takes two or more distinct values.
- Keep conditioning on $X$ implicit.
- Let $D_i(z)$ be the indicator ($= 1$ if adopted; $= 0$ if not)
  - It is a random variable for choice when we set $Z = z$. 
Imbens and Angrist assume the existence of an instrument $Z$ that takes two or more distinct values.

- Keep conditioning on $X$ implicit.
- Let $D_i(z)$ be the indicator ($= 1$ if adopted; $= 0$ if not)
- It is a random variable for choice when we set $Z = z$. 
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

**IV-1 (Independence)**

\[ Z \perp \perp (Y_1, Y_0, \{D(z)\}_{z \in Z}). \]

**IV-2 (Rank)**

\[ \Pr(D = 1 \mid Z) \text{ depends on } Z. \]

- They supplement the standard IV assumption with a “monotonicity” assumption.

**IV-3 (Monotonicity or Uniformity)**

\[ D_i(z) \geq D_i(z') \text{ or } D_i(z) \leq D_i(z') \quad i = 1, \ldots, I. \]
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- **Uniformity** of responses across persons.

Uniformity is satisfied when, for \( z < z' \), \( D_i(z) \leq D_i(z') \) for all \( i \), while for \( z'' > z' \), \( D_i(z'') \leq D_i(z') \) for all \( i \).
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- **Uniformity** of responses across persons.

- Uniformity is satisfied when, for $z < z'$, $D_i(z) \leq D_i(z')$ for all $i$, while for $z'' > z'$, $D_i(z'') \leq D_i(z')$ for all $i$. 
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- These conditions imply the LATE parameter.

\[
E(Y \mid Z = z) - E(Y \mid Z = z') = E((D(z) - D(z'))(Y_1 - Y_0)) \quad \text{(Independence)}
\]
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- Using iterated expectations,

\[
E(Y \mid Z = z) - E(Y \mid Z = z')
= 
\left( E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D(z) - D(z') = 1) \cdot Pr(D(z) - D(z') = 1) \right)
- \left( E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D(z) - D(z') = -1) \cdot Pr(D(z) - D(z') = -1) \right).
\]

- Monotonicity allows us to drop out one term.
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- Using iterated expectations,

\[
E(Y \mid Z = z) - E(Y \mid Z = z') = (E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D(z) - D(z') = 1) \cdot \Pr(D(z) - D(z') = 1) \\
- (E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D(z) - D(z') = -1) \cdot \Pr(D(z) - D(z') = -1))
\]

- Monotonicity allows us to drop out one term.
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- Suppose, for example, that \( \Pr(D(z) - D(z') = -1) = 0 \).
  Thus,

\[
E(Y \mid Z = z) - E(Y \mid Z = z') \\
= E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D(z) - D(z') = 1) \Pr(D(z) - D(z') = 1).
\]

\[
LATE = \frac{E(Y \mid Z = z) - E(Y \mid Z = z')}{\Pr(D = 1 \mid Z = z) - \Pr(D = 1 \mid Z = z')} \\
= E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D(z) - D(z') = 1)
\]

- The mean gain to those induced to switch from “0” to “1” by a change in \( Z \) from \( z' \) to \( z \).
Suppose, for example, that $\Pr(D(z) - D(z') = -1) = 0$. Thus,

$$E(Y | Z = z) - E(Y | Z = z') = E(Y_1 - Y_0 | D(z) - D(z') = 1) \Pr(D(z) - D(z') = 1).$$

\[
LATE = \frac{E(Y | Z = z) - E(Y | Z = z')}{\Pr(D = 1 | Z = z) - \Pr(D = 1 | Z = z')} = E(Y_1 - Y_0 | D(z) - D(z') = 1) \quad (1.8)
\]

The mean gain to those induced to switch from “0” to “1” by a change in $Z$ from $z'$ to $z$. 

Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- Observe $\text{LATE} = \text{ATE}$ if

  $$\Pr(D = 1 \mid Z = z) = 1 \quad \text{while} \quad \Pr(D = 1 \mid Z = z') = 0.$$ 

- “Identification at infinity” plays a crucial role throughout the entire literature on policy evaluation.
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- Observe $\text{LATE} = \text{ATE}$ if

\[ \Pr(D = 1 \mid Z = z) = 1 \quad \text{while} \quad \Pr(D = 1 \mid Z = z') = 0. \]

- “Identification at infinity” plays a crucial role throughout the entire literature on policy evaluation.
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- In general, $\text{LATE} \neq E(Y_1 - Y_0) = E(\beta)$.
- Not treatment on the treated: $E(\beta \mid D = 1)$.
- Different instruments define different parameters.
- Having a wealth of different strong instruments does not improve the precision of the estimate of any particular parameter (Heckman and Robb, 1986).
- When there are more than two distinct values of $Z$, Imbens and Angrist use Yitzhaki (1989) weights.
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- In general, $\text{LATE} \neq E(Y_1 - Y_0) = E(\beta)$.
- Not treatment on the treated: $E(\beta | D = 1)$.
- Different instruments define different parameters.
- Having a wealth of different strong instruments does not improve the precision of the estimate of any particular parameter (Heckman and Robb, 1986).
- When there are more than two distinct values of $Z$, Imbens and Angrist use Yitzhaki (1989) weights.
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- In general, \( \text{LATE} \neq E(Y_1 - Y_0) = E(\beta) \).
- Not treatment on the treated: \( E(\beta \mid D = 1) \).
- Different instruments define different parameters.
- Having a wealth of different strong instruments does not improve the precision of the estimate of any particular parameter (Heckman and Robb, 1986).
- When there are more than two distinct values of \( Z \), Imbens and Angrist use Yitzhaki (1989) weights.
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- In general, $\text{LATE} \neq E(Y_1 - Y_0) = E(\beta)$.

- Not treatment on the treated: $E(\beta \mid D = 1)$.

- Different instruments define different parameters.

- Having a wealth of different strong instruments does not improve the precision of the estimate of any particular parameter (Heckman and Robb, 1986).

- When there are more than two distinct values of $Z$, Imbens and Angrist use Yitzhaki (1989) weights.
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- In general, \( \text{LATE} \neq E(Y_1 - Y_0) = E(\beta) \).

- Not treatment on the treated: \( E(\beta | D = 1) \).

- Different instruments define different parameters.

- Having a wealth of different strong instruments does not improve the precision of the estimate of any particular parameter (Heckman and Robb, 1986).

- When there are more than two distinct values of \( Z \), Imbens and Angrist use Yitzhaki (1989) weights.
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- Goal of our work: unify literature with a common set of underlying parameters interpretable across studies.

- To understand how to connect the results of various disparate IV estimands within a unified framework.
Imbens Angrist conditions (1994)

- Goal of our work: unify literature with a common set of underlying parameters interpretable across studies.

- To understand how to connect the results of various disparate IV estimands within a unified framework.
IV in choice models

\[ D = 1[D^* > 0] \] \hspace{1cm} (2.1)

1[·] is an indicator (1[A] = 1 if A true; 0 otherwise).

\[ D^* = \mu_D(Z) - V \] \hspace{1cm} (2.2)

Example: \( \mu_D(Z) = \gamma Z \)

\[ D^* = \gamma Z - V \]
Examples

\[(V \perp Z) \mid X.\]

The propensity score:

\[P(z) = Pr(D = 1 \mid Z = z) = Pr(\gamma z > V) = F_V(\gamma z)\]

\(F_V\) is the distribution of \(V\).
Examples

Generalized Roy model

\[ D = 1[Y_1 - Y_0 - C > 0] \]

Costs \( C \) = \( \mu_C(W) + U_C \)

\( Z = (X, W) \)

\( \mu_D(Z) = \mu_1(X) - \mu_0(X) - \mu_C(W) \)

\( V = -(U_1 - U_0 - U_C) \).
Heterogeneous response model

In a general model with heterogeneous responses, specification of $P(Z)$ and its relationship with the instrument play a crucial role.

$$\text{Cov}(Z, \eta D) = E \left( (Z - \bar{Z}) \eta D \right)$$

$$= E \left( (Z - \bar{Z}) \eta \mid D = 1 \right) \Pr (D = 1)$$

$$= E \left( (Z - \bar{Z}) \eta \mid \gamma Z > V \right) \Pr (\gamma Z > V).$$

$$F_V(\gamma Z) > F_V(V) \quad P(Z) > U_D$$

- Probability of selection enters the covariance even though we use only one component of $Z$ as an instrument.
Selection models control for this dependence induced by choice.
Selection models

Assume

\[(U_1, U_0, V) \perp\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\perp Z \quad (2.3)\]

[Alternatively \((\varepsilon, \eta, V) \perp\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\perp Z\).]

\[\eta = (U_1 - U_0), \quad \varepsilon = U_0 \quad (2.4)\]

\[E(Y | D = 0, Z = z) = E(Y_0 | D = 0, Z = z) = \alpha + E(U_0 | \gamma z < V)\]

\[E(Y | D = 0, Z = z) = \alpha + K_0(P(z))\]

control function
Selection models

\[ E(Y \mid D = 1, Z = z) = E(Y_1 \mid D = 1, Z = z) \]
\[ = \alpha + \bar{\beta} + E(U_1 \mid \gamma z > V) \]
\[ = \alpha + \bar{\beta} + K_1(P(z)) \]

- \( K_0(P(z)) \) and \( K_1(P(z)) \) are control functions in the sense of Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986).
- \( P(z) \) is an essential ingredient.
- Matching: \( K_1(P(z)) = K_0(P(z)) \).
Selection models

\[ E(Y \mid D = 1, Z = z) = E(Y_1 \mid D = 1, Z = z) \]
\[ = \alpha + \bar{\beta} + E(U_1 \mid \gamma z > V) \]
\[ = \alpha + \bar{\beta} + K_1(P(z)) \]

- \( K_0(P(z)) \) and \( K_1(P(z)) \) are control functions in the sense of Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986).

- \( P(z) \) is an essential ingredient.

Matching: \( K_1(P(z)) = K_0(P(z)) \).
Selection models

\[
E (Y \mid D = 1, Z = z) = E (Y_1 \mid D = 1, Z = z) \\
= \alpha + \bar{\beta} + E (U_1 \mid \gamma z > V) \\
= \alpha + \bar{\beta} + K_1(P(z))
\]

- \(K_0(P(z))\) and \(K_1(P(z))\) are control functions in the sense of Heckman and Robb (1985, 1986).
- \(P(z)\) is an essential ingredient.
- Matching: \(K_1(P(z)) = K_0(P(z))\).
In a model where $\beta$ is variable and not independent of $V$, misspecification of $Z$ affects the interpretation of what IV estimates analogous to its role in selection models.

Misspecification of $Z$ affects both approaches to identification.

This is a new phenomenon in models with heterogenous $\beta$. 
In a model where $\beta$ is variable and not independent of $V$, misspecification of $Z$ affects the interpretation of what IV estimates analogous to its role in selection models.

Misspecification of $Z$ affects both approaches to identification.

This is a new phenomenon in models with heterogenous $\beta$. 
In a model where $\beta$ is variable and not independent of $V$, misspecification of $Z$ affects the interpretation of what IV estimates analogous to its role in selection models.

Misspecification of $Z$ affects both approaches to identification.

This is a new phenomenon in models with heterogenous $\beta$. 
Model for outcomes

\begin{align*}
Y_1 &= \mu_1(X, U_1) \\
Y_0 &= \mu_0(X, U_0).
\end{align*}

- \(X\) are observed and \((U_1, U_0)\) are unobserved by the analyst.
- The \(X\) may be dependent on \(U_0\) and \(U_1\).
- Generalize choice model (2.1) and (2.2) for \(D^*\), a latent utility.
Model for outcomes

\[ Y_1 = \mu_1(X, U_1) \]
\[ Y_0 = \mu_0(X, U_0). \] (3.1)

- \( X \) are observed and \((U_1, U_0)\) are unobserved by the analyst.
- The \( X \) may be dependent on \( U_0 \) and \( U_1 \).
- Generalize choice model (2.1) and (2.2) for \( D^* \), a latent utility.
Model for outcomes

\[ Y_1 = \mu_1(X, U_1) \]
\[ Y_0 = \mu_0(X, U_0). \]  

- \( X \) are observed and \((U_1, U_0)\) are unobserved by the analyst.
- The \( X \) may be dependent on \( U_0 \) and \( U_1 \).
- Generalize choice model (2.1) and (2.2) for \( D^* \), a latent utility.
Model for outcomes

\[ D^* = \mu_D (Z) - V \quad \text{and} \quad D = 1 (D^* \geq 0) \quad (3.2) \]

\( \mu_D (Z) - V \) can be interpreted as a net utility for a person with characteristics \((Z, V)\).

\( \beta = Y_1 - Y_0 = \mu_1 (X, U_1) - \mu_0 (X, U_0) \) (Treatment Effect)
A special case that links our analysis to standard models in econometrics:

- \( Y_1 = X \beta_1 + U_1 \) and
- \( Y_0 = X \beta_0 + U_0 \); so
- \( \beta = X(\beta_1 - \beta_0) + (U_1 - U_0) \).

In the case of separable outcomes, heterogeneity in \( \beta \) arises because in general \( U_1 \neq U_0 \) and people differ in their \( X \).

Model for outcomes

- A special case that links our analysis to standard models in econometrics:

- \[ Y_1 = X\beta_1 + U_1 \] and

- \[ Y_0 = X\beta_0 + U_0; \] so

- \[ \beta = X (\beta_1 - \beta_0) + (U_1 - U_0). \]

- In the case of separable outcomes, heterogeneity in \( \beta \) arises because in general \( U_1 \neq U_0 \) and people differ in their \( X \).

Model for outcomes

- A special case that links our analysis to standard models in econometrics:
  - $Y_1 = X\beta_1 + U_1$ and
  - $Y_0 = X\beta_0 + U_0$; so
  $$\beta = X (\beta_1 - \beta_0) + (U_1 - U_0).$$
- In the case of separable outcomes, heterogeneity in $\beta$ arises because in general $U_1 \neq U_0$ and people differ in their $X$.
Model for outcomes

- A special case that links our analysis to standard models in econometrics:
  - $Y_1 = X\beta_1 + U_1$ and
  - $Y_0 = X\beta_0 + U_0$; so
  - $\beta = X(\beta_1 - \beta_0) + (U_1 - U_0)$.

- In the case of separable outcomes, heterogeneity in $\beta$ arises because in general $U_1 \neq U_0$ and people differ in their $X$.

Model for outcomes

- A special case that links our analysis to standard models in econometrics:
  - \( Y_1 = X \beta_1 + U_1 \) and
  - \( Y_0 = X \beta_0 + U_0 \); so

\[
\beta = X (\beta_1 - \beta_0) + (U_1 - U_0).
\]

- In the case of separable outcomes, heterogeneity in \( \beta \) arises because in general \( U_1 \neq U_0 \) and people differ in their \( X \).

A special case that links our analysis to standard models in econometrics:

\[ Y_1 = X \beta_1 + U_1 \] and

\[ Y_0 = X \beta_0 + U_0 \]; so

\[ \beta = X (\beta_1 - \beta_0) + (U_1 - U_0). \]

In the case of separable outcomes, heterogeneity in \( \beta \) arises because in general \( U_1 \neq U_0 \) and people differ in their \( X \).

Assumptions

A-1

The distribution of $\mu_D(Z)$ conditional on $X$ is nondegenerate (Rank Condition for IV). This says that we can vary $Z$ (excluded from outcome equations) given $X$. Key property of an instrument.

A-2

$(U_0, U_1, V)$ are independent of $Z$ conditional on $X$ (Independence Condition for IV). $Z$ is not affecting potential outcomes or affecting the unobservables affecting choices.
Assumptions

A-3

The distribution of $V$ is continuous (not essential).

A-4

$E |Y_1| < \infty$, and $E |Y_0| < \infty$ (Finite Means).
Assumptions

A-5

1 > Pr (D = 1 | X) > 0 \(\text{(For each } X \text{ there is a treatment group and a comparison group)}\).

A-6

Let \(X_0\) denote the counterfactual value of \(X\) that would have been observed if \(D\) is set to 0. \(X_1\) is defined analogously. Thus \(X_d = X\), for \(d = 0, 1\) \(\text{(The } X_d \text{ are invariant to counterfactual manipulations)}\).
Separability between $V$ and $\mu_D(Z)$ in choice equation is conventional.

Plays an important role in the properties of instrumental variable estimators in models with essential heterogeneity.

It implies monotonicity (uniformity) condition (IV-3) from choice equation (3.2).

Vytlacil (2002) shows that independence and monotonicity (IV-3) imply the existence of a $V$ and representation (3.2) given some regularity conditions.
Separability between $V$ and $\mu_D(Z)$ in choice equation is conventional.

Plays an important role in the properties of instrumental variable estimators in models with essential heterogeneity.

It implies monotonicity (uniformity) condition (IV-3) from choice equation (3.2).

Vytlacil (2002) shows that independence and monotonicity (IV-3) imply the existence of a $V$ and representation (3.2) given some regularity conditions.
Separability between $V$ and $\mu_D(Z)$ in choice equation is conventional.

Plays an important role in the properties of instrumental variable estimators in models with essential heterogeneity.

It implies monotonicity (uniformity) condition (IV-3) from choice equation (3.2).

Vytlacil (2002) shows that independence and monotonicity (IV-3) imply the existence of a $V$ and representation (3.2) given some regularity conditions.
Separability between $V$ and $\mu_D(Z)$ in choice equation is conventional.

Plays an important role in the properties of instrumental variable estimators in models with essential heterogeneity.

It implies monotonicity (uniformity) condition (IV-3) from choice equation (3.2).

Vytlacil (2002) shows that independence and monotonicity (IV-3) imply the existence of a $V$ and representation (3.2) given some regularity conditions.
Use probability integral transform to write

\[ D = 1 \left[ F_V (\mu_D (Z)) > F_V (V) \right] = 1 \left[ P (Z) > U_D \right] \quad (3.3) \]

\[ U_D = F_V (V) \text{ and } P (Z) = F_V (\mu_D (Z)) = \Pr[D = 1 \mid Z] \]

- \( P(Z) \) is transformation of mean scale utility in a discrete choice model.
A basic parameter that can be used to unify the treatment effect literature:

$$\Delta^{\text{MTE}}(x, u_D) = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid X = x, U_D = u_D).$$

$$= E(\beta \mid X = x, V = v)$$

MTE and the local average treatment effect (LATE) parameter are closely related.

For \((z, z') \in \mathcal{Z}(x) \times \mathcal{Z}(x)\) so that \(P(z) > P(z')\), under (IV-3) and independence (A-2), LATE is:

$$\Delta^{\text{LATE}}(z', z) = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D(z) = 1, D(z') = 0) \quad (3.4)$$
A basic parameter that can be used to unify the treatment effect literature:

\[
\Delta^{\text{MTE}}(x, u_D) = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid X = x, U_D = u_D).
\]

\[
= E(\beta \mid X = x, V = v)
\]

MTE and the local average treatment effect (LATE) parameter are closely related.

For \((z, z') \in \mathcal{Z}(x) \times \mathcal{Z}(x)\) so that \(P(z) > P(z')\), under (IV-3) and independence (A-2), LATE is:

\[
\Delta^{\text{LATE}}(z', z) = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D(z) = 1, D(z') = 0) \quad (3.4)
\]
A basic parameter that can be used to unify the treatment effect literature:

$$\Delta^{MTE}(x, u_D) = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid X = x, U_D = u_D).$$

$$= E(\beta \mid X = x, V = v)$$

MTE and the local average treatment effect (LATE) parameter are closely related.

For \((z, z') \in \mathcal{Z}(x) \times \mathcal{Z}(x)\) so that \(P(z) > P(z')\), under \((IV-3)\) and independence \((A-2)\), LATE is:

$$\Delta^{LATE}(z', z) = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D(z) = 1, D(z') = 0) \quad (3.4)$$
LATE can be written in a fashion free of any instrument:

\[
E (Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D(z) = 1, D(z') = 0) = E (Y_1 - Y_0 \mid u'_D < U_D < u_D) = \Delta^{\text{LATE}}(u'_D, u_D)
\]

\[
u_D = \Pr(D(z) = 1) = \Pr(D(z) = 1 \mid Z = z) = \Pr(D(z) = 1) = P(z)
\]

\[
u'_D = \Pr(D(z') = 1 \mid Z = z') = \Pr(D(z') = 1) = P(z')
\]

The \( z \) just help us define evaluation points for the \( u_D \).
Under (A-1)–(A-5), all standard treatment parameters are weighted averages of MTE with weights that can be estimated.
**LATE, the marginal treatment effect and instrumental variables**

### Table 1A: treatment effects and estimands as weighted averages of the marginal treatment effect

\[
\text{ATE}(x) = E (Y_1 - Y_0 \mid X = x) = \int_0^1 \Delta^{\text{MTE}}(x, u_D) \, du_D
\]

\[
\text{TT}(x) = E (Y_1 - Y_0 \mid X = x, D = 1) = \int_0^1 \Delta^{\text{MTE}}(x, u_D) \omega_{\text{TT}}(x, u_D) \, du_D
\]

\[
\text{TUT}(x) = E (Y_1 - Y_0 \mid X = x, D = 0) = \int_0^1 \Delta^{\text{MTE}}(x, u_D) \omega_{\text{TUT}}(x, u_D) \, du_D
\]

**Policy Relevant Treatment Effect (x)**

\[
= E (Y_{a'} \mid X = x) - E (Y_a \mid X = x) = \int_0^1 \Delta^{\text{MTE}}(x, u_D) \omega_{\text{PRTE}}(x, u_D) \, du_D
\]

for two policies \(a\) and \(a'\) that affect the \(Z\) but not the \(X\)

\[
\text{IV}_J(x) = \int_0^1 \Delta^{\text{MTE}}(x, u_D) \omega^J_{\text{IV}}(x, u_D) \, du_D, \text{ given instrument } J
\]

\[
\text{OLS}(x) = \int_0^1 \Delta^{\text{MTE}}(x, u_D) \omega_{\text{OLS}}(x, u_D) \, du_D
\]
LATE, the marginal treatment effect and instrumental variables

Table 1B: weights

\[
\omega_{ATE}(x, u_D) = 1
\]

\[
\omega_{TT}(x, u_D) = \left[ \int_{u_D}^{1} f(p \mid X = x) dp \right] \frac{1}{E(P \mid X = x)}
\]

\[
\omega_{TUT}(x, u_D) = \left[ \int_{0}^{u_D} f(p \mid X = x) dp \right] \frac{1}{E(1 - P \mid X = x)}
\]

\[
\omega_{PRTE}(x, u_D) = \left[ \frac{F_{P_{a'}, X}(u_D) - F_{P_{a}, X}(u_D)}{\Delta P} \right]
\]
LATE, the marginal treatment effect and instrumental variables

**Table 1B: weights**

\[
\omega_{IV}^{J}(x, u_D) = \frac{\int_{u_D}^{1} (J(Z) - E(J(Z) \mid X = x)) \int f_{J,P|x}(j, t \mid X = x) \, dt \, dj}{\text{Cov}(J(Z), D \mid X = x)}
\]

\[
\omega_{OLS}(x, u_D) = 1 + \left\{ \frac{E(U_1 \mid X = x, U_D = u_D) \omega_1(x, u_D)}{\Delta^{MTE}(x, u_D)} \right\}
\]

\[
\omega_{OLS}(x, u_D) = 1 + \left\{ \frac{E(U_0 \mid X = x, U_D = u_D) \omega_0(x, u_D)}{\Delta^{MTE}(x, u_D)} \right\}
\]
LATE, the marginal treatment effect and instrumental variables

**Table 1B: weights**

\[
\begin{align*}
\omega_1(x, u_D) &= \left[ \int_{u_D}^{1} f(p \mid X = x) \, dp \right] \left[ \frac{1}{E(P \mid X = x)} \right] \\
\omega_0(x, u_D) &= \left[ \int_{0}^{u_D} f(p \mid X = x) \, dp \right] \frac{1}{E((1 - P) \mid X = x)}
\end{align*}
\]

**Source:** Heckman and Vytlacil (2005)
Figure 2: weights for the marginal treatment effect for different parameters
LATE, the marginal treatment effect and instrumental variables

- $E(\beta \mid U_D = u_D)$ does not vary with $u_D$.

- “Standard case.”

- $\text{ATE} = \text{TT} = \text{LATE} = \text{policy counterfactuals} = \text{plim IV}$. 
LATE, the marginal treatment effect and instrumental variables

- $E(\beta \mid U_D = u_D)$ does not vary with $u_D$.
- “Standard case.”
- $\text{ATE} = \text{TT} = \text{LATE} = \text{policy counterfactuals} = \text{plim IV.}$
LATE, the marginal treatment effect and instrumental variables

- \( E(\beta \mid U_D = u_D) \) does not vary with \( u_D \).
- “Standard case.”
- \( ATE = TT = LATE = \) policy counterfactuals = plim IV.
When will $E(\beta \mid U_D = u_D)$ not vary with $u_D$?

1. If $U_1 = U_0 \Rightarrow \beta$ a Constant.

2. More Generally, if $U_1 - U_0$ is mean independent of $U_D$, so treatment effect heterogeneity is allowed but individuals do not act upon their own idiosyncratic effect.
When will $E(\beta \mid U_D = u_D)$ not vary with $u_D$?

1. If $U_1 = U_0 \Rightarrow \beta$ a Constant.

2. More Generally, if $U_1 - U_0$ is mean independent of $U_D$, so treatment effect heterogeneity is allowed but individuals do not act upon their own idiosyncratic effect.
Consider standard analysis.

\[ \ln Y = \alpha + (\bar{\beta} + U_1 - U_0)D + U_0 \]

plim of OLS:

\[
E (\ln Y \mid D = 1) - E (\ln Y \mid D = 0) = \bar{\beta} + E(U_1 - U_0 \mid D = 1) + \left\{ \begin{array}{c}
E(U_0 \mid D = 1) \\
- E(U_0 \mid D = 0)
\end{array} \right\}
= \text{ATE} + \text{Sorting Gain} + \text{Ability Bias}
= \text{TT} + \text{Ability Bias}
LATE, the marginal treatment effect and instrumental variables

- If ATE is a parameter of interest, OLS suffers from both sorting bias and ability bias.
- If TT is parameter of interest, OLS suffers from ability bias.
- Using IV removes ability bias, but changes the parameter being estimated (neither ATE nor TT in general).
- Different IV Weight MTE differently.
- We derive IV weights below.
If ATE is a parameter of interest, OLS suffers from both sorting bias and ability bias.

If TT is parameter of interest, OLS suffers from ability bias.

Using IV removes ability bias, but changes the parameter being estimated (neither ATE nor TT in general).

Different IV Weight MTE differently.

We derive IV weights below.
LATE, the marginal treatment effect and instrumental variables

- If ATE is a parameter of interest, OLS suffers from both sorting bias and ability bias.

- If TT is parameter of interest, OLS suffers from ability bias.

- Using IV removes ability bias, but changes the parameter being estimated (neither ATE nor TT in general).

- Different IV Weight MTE differently.

- We derive IV weights below.
If ATE is a parameter of interest, OLS suffers from both sorting bias and ability bias.

If TT is parameter of interest, OLS suffers from ability bias.

Using IV removes ability bias, but changes the parameter being estimated (neither ATE nor TT in general).

Different IV Weight MTE differently.

We derive IV weights below.
If ATE is a parameter of interest, OLS suffers from both sorting bias and ability bias.

If TT is parameter of interest, OLS suffers from ability bias.

Using IV removes ability bias, but changes the parameter being estimated (neither ATE nor TT in general).

Different IV Weight MTE differently.

We derive IV weights below.
• IV Instrument Dependent (which $Z$ used and which values of $Z$ used).

• Hence studies using different $Z$ are not comparable.

• How to make studies comparable?

• We can test to see if these complications are required in any particular empirical analysis.
∴ IV Instrument Dependent (which $Z$ used and which values of $Z$ used).

Hence studies using different $Z$ are not comparable.

How to make studies comparable?

We can test to see if these complications are required in any particular empirical analysis.
LATE, the marginal treatment effect and instrumental variables

∴ IV Instrument Dependent (which Z used and which values of Z used).

Hence studies using different Z are not comparable.

How to make studies comparable?

We can test to see if these complications are required in any particular empirical analysis.
LATE, the marginal treatment effect and instrumental variables

- ∴ IV Instrument Dependent (which $Z$ used and which values of $Z$ used).

- Hence studies using different $Z$ are not comparable.

- How to make studies comparable?

- We can test to see if these complications are required in any particular empirical analysis.
Identifying MTE

Testing for essential heterogeneity

\[
E(Y \mid Z = z) = E(Y \mid P(Z) = p) \text{ (index sufficiency)}
\]
\[
= E(DY_1 + (1 - D)Y_0 \mid P(Z) = p)
\]
\[
= E(Y_0) + E(D(Y_1 - Y_0) \mid P(Z) = p)
\]
\[
= E(Y_0) + \left[ E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D = 1, P(Z) = p) \cdot \Pr(D = 1 \mid Z = z) \right]
\]
\[
= E(Y_0) + \int_0^p E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid U_D = u_D) \, du_D.
\]
Identifying MTE

Testing for essential heterogeneity

As a consequence, we get LIV (Local Instrumental Variables), which identifies MTE

\[
\left. \frac{\partial}{\partial P(Z)} E (Y \mid Z = z) \right|_{P(Z)=u_D} = \underbrace{E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid U_D = u_D)}_{MTE}.
\]  

- When \( \beta \perp D \), \( Y \) is linear in \( P(Z) \):
  \[E (Y \mid Z) = a + bP(Z)\]
  \[b = \Delta^{MTE} = \Delta^{ATE} = \Delta^{TT}.
\]

- These results are valid whether or not \( Y_1 \) and \( Y_0 \) are separable in \( U_1 \) and \( U_0 \).

- Therefore we can identify the treatment parameters using estimated weights and estimated MTE.
Testing for essential heterogeneity

As a consequence, we get LIV (Local Instrumental Variables), which identifies MTE

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial P(z)} E(Y \mid Z = z) \bigg|_{P(Z) = u_D} = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid U_D = u_D). \tag{3.6}
\]

- When \( \beta \perp D \), \( Y \) is linear in \( P(Z) \):
  \[
  E(Y \mid Z) = a + bP(Z) \tag{3.7}
  \]
  where \( b = \Delta^{MTE} = \Delta^{ATE} = \Delta^{TT} \).

- These results are valid whether or not \( Y_1 \) and \( Y_0 \) are separable in \( U_1 \) and \( U_0 \).

- Therefore we can identify the treatment parameters using estimated weights and estimated MTE.
Testing for essential heterogeneity

As a consequence, we get LIV (Local Instrumental Variables), which identifies MTE

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial P(Z)} E(Y \mid Z = z) \bigg|_{P(Z) = u_D} = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid U_D = u_D). \tag{3.6}
\]

- When \( \beta \perp D \), \( Y \) is linear in \( P(Z) \):

\[
E(Y \mid Z) = a + bP(Z) \tag{3.7}
\]

where \( b = \Delta^{MTE} = \Delta^{ATE} = \Delta^{TT} \).

- These results are valid whether or not \( Y_1 \) and \( Y_0 \) are separable in \( U_1 \) and \( U_0 \).

- Therefore we can identify the treatment parameters using estimated weights and estimated MTE.
Example: college attendance on wages for high school graduates

\[ E(Y \mid X, P) \] as a function of \( P \) for average \( X \)

Source: Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2006)
Identifying MTE

Example: college attendance on wages for high school graduates

$E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid X, U_S)$ estimated using locally quadratic regression (averaged over $X$)

Source: Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2006)
Example: costs of breast cancer treatments using different instruments in $P(Z)$

Source: Basu, Heckman and Urzua
Example: costs of breast cancer treatments using different instruments in $P(Z)$

Source: Basu, Heckman and Urzua
Identifying MTE

Example: costs of breast cancer treatments using different instruments in $P(Z)$

Estimated propensity score for BCSRT and MST

\[ \text{MTE}(\eta_q, u_D) \]

Source: Basu, Heckman and Urzua
Identifying MTE

Example: costs of breast cancer treatments using different instruments in $P(Z)$

\[ \omega_{ATE}(\eta_q, u_D) \]

\[ MTE(u_D) \]

MTE(UD) Profile and 95% CI with IV = NORTH

Source: Basu, Heckman and Urzua
Identifying MTE

Example: costs of breast cancer treatments using different instruments in $P(Z)$

Source: Basu, Heckman and Urzua
Identifying MTE

Example: costs of breast cancer treatments using different instruments in $P(Z)$

Source: Basu, Heckman and Urzua
Identifying MTE

Example: costs of breast cancer treatments using different instruments in $P(Z)$

Source: Basu, Heckman and Urzua
Example: unionism on wages

Example: unionism on wages

Consider $J(Z)$ as an instrument, a scalar function of $Z$.

$$\Delta_{IV}^{J} = \frac{\text{Cov}(Y, J(Z))}{\text{Cov}(D, J(Z))}$$

Express it as a weighted average of MTE.

$Z$ can be a vector of instruments.
Consider $J(Z)$ as an instrument, a scalar function of $Z$.

$$\Delta_{IV}^J = \frac{\text{Cov}(Y, J(Z))}{\text{Cov}(D, J(Z))}$$

Express it as a weighted average of MTE.

$Z$ can be a vector of instruments.
Consider \( J(Z) \) as an instrument, a scalar function of \( Z \).

\[
\Delta_{IV}^J = \frac{\mathrm{Cov}(Y, J(Z))}{\mathrm{Cov}(D, J(Z))}
\]

Express it as a weighted average of MTE.

\( Z \) can be a vector of instruments.
Understanding what linear IV estimates

Under (A-1)–(A-5) and separable choice model

\[ \Delta^\text{IV}_J = \int_0^1 \Delta^\text{MTE}(u_D) \omega^\text{IV}_J(u_D) \, du_D \]  \hspace{1cm} (3.8)

\[ \omega^\text{IV}_J(u_D) = \frac{E\left(J(Z) - \bar{J}(Z) \mid P(Z) > u_D\right) \Pr(P(Z) > u_D)}{\text{Cov}(J(Z), D)} . \]  \hspace{1cm} (3.9)

\(J(Z)\) and \(P(Z)\) do not have to be continuous random variables.

Functional forms of \(P(Z)\) and \(J(Z)\) are general.
Dependence between $J(Z)$ and $P(Z)$ gives shape and sign to the weights.

If $J(Z) = P(Z)$, then weights obviously non-negative.

If $E(J(Z) - \bar{J}(Z) \mid P(Z) \geq u_D)$ not monotonic in $u_D$, weights can be negative.
Understanding what linear IV estimates

- Dependence between $J(Z)$ and $P(Z)$ gives shape and sign to the weights.
- If $J(Z) = P(Z)$, then weights obviously non-negative.
- If $E(J(Z) - \tilde{J}(Z) \mid P(Z) \geq u_D)$ not monotonic in $u_D$, weights can be negative.
Understanding what linear IV estimates

- Dependence between $J(Z)$ and $P(Z)$ gives shape and sign to the weights.

- If $J(Z) = P(Z)$, then weights obviously non-negative.

- If $E(J(Z) - \tilde{J}(Z) \mid P(Z) \geq u_D)$ not monotonic in $u_D$, weights can be negative.
Understanding what linear IV estimates

When \( J(Z) = P(Z) \), weight (3.9) follows from Yitzhaki (1989).

- He considers a regression function \( E(Y \mid P(Z) = p) \).

- Linear regression of \( Y \) on \( P \) identifies

\[
\beta_{Y,P} = \int_0^1 \left[ \frac{\partial E(Y \mid P(Z) = p)}{\partial p} \right] \omega(p) \, dp,
\]

\[
\omega(p) = \frac{\int p(t - E(P)) \, dF_P(t)}{\text{Var}(P)}.
\]

- This is the weight (3.9) when \( P \) is the instrument.

- This expression does not require uniformity or monotonicity for the model; consistent with 2-way flows.
Understanding what linear IV estimates

When \( J(Z) = P(Z) \), weight (3.9) follows from Yitzhaki (1989).

- He considers a regression function \( E(Y \mid P(Z) = p) \).

- Linear regression of \( Y \) on \( P \) identifies

\[
\beta_{Y,P} = \int_0^1 \left[ \frac{\partial E(Y \mid P(Z) = p)}{\partial p} \right] \omega(p) \, dp,
\]

\[
\omega(p) = \frac{1}{Var(P)} \int_0^1 (t - E(P)) \, dF_P(t).
\]

- This is the weight (3.9) when \( P \) is the instrument.

- This expression does not require uniformity or monotonicity for the model; consistent with 2-way flows.
When $J(Z) = P(Z)$, weight (3.9) follows from Yitzhaki (1989).

- He considers a regression function $E(Y \mid P(Z) = p)$.
- Linear regression of $Y$ on $P$ identifies

$$
\beta_{Y,P} = \int_0^1 \left[ \frac{\partial E(Y \mid P(Z) = p)}{\partial p} \right] \omega(p) \, dp,
$$

$$
\omega(p) = \frac{\int (t - E(P)) \, dF_P(t)}{Var(P)}.
$$

- This is the weight (3.9) when $P$ is the instrument.

- This expression does not require uniformity or monotonicity for the model; consistent with 2-way flows.
When $J(Z) = P(Z)$, weight (3.9) follows from Yitzhaki (1989).

- He considers a regression function $E(Y \mid P(Z) = p)$.

- Linear regression of $Y$ on $P$ identifies

$$
\beta_{Y,P} = \int_{0}^{1} \left[ \frac{\partial E(Y \mid P(Z) = p)}{\partial p} \right] \omega(p) \, dp,
$$

$$
\omega(p) = \frac{\int (t - E(P)) \, dF_{P}(t)}{p \cdot Var(P)}.
$$

- This is the weight (3.9) when $P$ is the instrument.

- This expression does not require uniformity or monotonicity for the model; consistent with 2-way flows.
Understanding what linear IV estimates

Yitzhaki’s theorem

**Theorem**

Assume $(Y, X)$ i.i.d. $E(|Y|) < \infty$ $E(|X|) < \infty$

$$\mu_Y = E(Y) \quad \mu_X = E(X)$$

$E(Y \mid X) = g(X)$

Assume $g'(X)$ exists and $E(|g'(X)|) < \infty$. 
Understanding what linear IV estimates

Yitzhaki’s theorem

Theorem (cont.)

Then,

\[
\frac{\text{Cov}(Y, X)}{\text{Var}(X)} = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g'(t) \omega(t) \, dt,
\]

where

\[
\omega(t) = \frac{1}{\text{Var}(X)} \int_t^{\infty} (x - \mu_X) f_X(x) \, dx
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{\text{Var}(X)} \mathbb{E}(X - \mu_X \mid X > t) \Pr(X > t).
\]

\[
Y = \pi X + \eta,
\]

\[
\pi = \frac{\text{Cov}(Y, X)}{\text{Var}(X)}.
\]
Understanding what linear IV estimates

**Proof of Yitzhaki’s theorem**

**Proof.**

\[
\text{Cov}(Y, X) = \text{Cov}(E(Y \mid X), X) = \text{Cov}(g(X), X) \\
= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(t)(t - \mu_X) f_X(t) \, dt
\]

where \( t \) is an argument of integration.
Proof of Yitzhaki's theorem

Integration by parts:

\[ \text{Cov}(Y, X) = g(t) \int_{-\infty}^{t} (x - \mu_X) f_X(x) \, dx \bigg|_{-\infty}^{\infty} \]

\[ - \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g'(t) \int_{-\infty}^{t} (x - \mu_X) f_X(x) \, dx \, dt \]

\[ = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g'(t) \int_{t}^{\infty} (x - \mu_X) f_X(x) \, dx \, dt, \]

since \( E(X - \mu_X) = 0. \)
Proof of Yitzhaki’s theorem

Therefore,

$$\text{Cov}(Y, X) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g'(t) E(X - \mu_X \mid X > t) \Pr(X > t) \, dt.$$ 

∴ Result follows with

$$\omega(t) = \frac{1}{\text{Var}(X)} E(X - \mu_X \mid X > t) \Pr(X > t)$$
• Weights positive.

• Integrate to one (use integration by parts formula).

• \( = 0 \) when \( t \to \infty \) and \( t \to -\infty \).

We get claimed results on weights for TSLS when in place of \( X \) we use \( P(Z) \).

• Weight reaches its peak at \( t = \mu_X \), if \( f_X \) has density at \( x = \mu_X \):

\[
\frac{d}{dt} \int_{t}^{\infty} (x - \mu_X) f_X(x) \, dx \, dt = -(t - \mu_X) f_X(t)
\]

\[
= 0 \quad \text{at} \quad t = \mu_X.
\]
Understanding what linear IV estimates

- Weights positive.
- Integrate to one (use integration by parts formula).
  - $= 0$ when $t \to \infty$ and $t \to -\infty$.

We get claimed results on weights for TSLS when in place of $X$ we use $P(Z)$.

- Weight reaches its peak at $t = \mu_X$, if $f_X$ has density at $x = \mu_X$:

$$\frac{d}{dt} \int_t^\infty (x - \mu_X) f_X(x) \, dx \, dt = -(t - \mu_X)f_X(t)$$

$$= 0 \quad \text{at} \quad t = \mu_X.$$
Weights positive.

Integrate to one (use integration by parts formula).

= 0 when \( t \to \infty \) and \( t \to -\infty \).

We get claimed results on weights for TSLS when in place of \( X \) we use \( P(Z) \).

Weight reaches its peak at \( t = \mu_X \), if \( f_X \) has density at \( x = \mu_X \):

\[
\frac{d}{dt} \int_t^\infty (x - \mu_X) f_X(x) \, dx \, dt = -(t - \mu_X)f_X(t)
\]

\[
= 0 \quad \text{at} \quad t = \mu_X.
\]
Weights positive.

Integrate to one (use integration by parts formula).

\[ = 0 \text{ when } t \to \infty \text{ and } t \to -\infty. \]

We get claimed results on weights for TSLS when in place of \( X \) we use \( P(Z) \).

Weight reaches its peak at \( t = \mu_X \), if \( f_X \) has density at \( x = \mu_X \):

\[
\frac{d}{dt} \int_t^\infty (x - \mu_X) f_X(x) \, dx \, dt = -(t - \mu_X)f_X(t)
\]

\[
= 0 \text{ at } t = \mu_X.
\]
Understanding what linear IV estimates

**Yitzhaki’s weights for \( X \sim \text{BetaPDF}(x, \alpha, \beta) \)**

![Graph showing Yitzhaki's weights for various values of \( \alpha, \beta \).]

- \( d[g(x)]/dx; b=0, c=0.5 \)
- \( w(x); \beta=1, \sigma_{X,Y}/\sigma_X^2 = 0.73774 \)
- \( w(x); \beta=2, \sigma_{X,Y}/\sigma_X^2 = 0.80701 \)
- \( w(x); \beta=5, \sigma_{X,Y}/\sigma_X^2 = 1.1052 \)
- \( w(x); \beta=10, \sigma_{X,Y}/\sigma_X^2 = 1.6054 \)

\( x, g(x) = b x + c \log(x), X \sim \text{BetaPDF}(x, \alpha, \beta); \alpha = 5 \)
Yitzhaki’s weights for $X \sim \text{BetaPDF}(x, \alpha, \beta)$

$$E(Y|X = x) = g(x) \Rightarrow \frac{\text{Cov}(X,Y)}{\text{Var}(X)} = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g'(t)w(t)dx$$

$$w(t) = \frac{1}{\text{Var}(X)} E(X|X > t) \cdot \text{Pr}(X > t)$$

$$X \sim \text{BetaPDF}(x, \alpha, \beta) = \frac{x^{\alpha-1}(1-x)^{\beta-1}}{B(\alpha,\beta)}; \quad \alpha = 5;$$

$$g(x) = 0.5 \cdot x + 0.5 \cdot \log(X)$$
Can apply Yitzhaki’s analysis to the treatment effect model

\[ Y = \alpha + \beta D + \varepsilon \]

\( P(Z) \), the propensity score is the instrument:

\[ E(Y \mid Z = z) = E(Y \mid P(Z) = p) \]
Can apply Yitzhaki’s analysis to the treatment effect model

\[ Y = \alpha + \beta D + \varepsilon \]

\( P(Z) \), the propensity score is the instrument:

\[ E(Y \mid Z = z) = E(Y \mid P(Z) = p) \]
Understanding what linear IV estimates

\[
E(Y \mid P(Z) = p) = \alpha + E(\beta D \mid P(Z) = p)
\]

\[
= \alpha + E(\beta \mid D = 1, P(Z) = p) p
\]

\[
= \alpha + E(\beta \mid P(Z) > U_D, P(Z) = p) p
\]

\[
= \alpha + E(\beta \mid p > U_D) p
\]

\[
= \alpha + \int \beta \int_0^p f(\beta, u_D) \, du_D \underbrace{g(p)}_{g(p)}
\]

- Derivative with respect to \( p \) is MTE.

- \( g'(p) \) = MTE and weights as before.
Understanding what linear IV estimates

\[
E(Y \mid P(Z) = p) = \alpha + E(\beta D \mid P(Z) = p)
\]

\[
= \alpha + E(\beta \mid D = 1, P(Z) = p) p
\]

\[
= \alpha + E(\beta \mid P(Z) > U_D, P(Z) = p) p
\]

\[
= \alpha + E(\beta \mid p > U_D) p
\]

\[
= \alpha + \int_0^p \beta \int_0^p f(\beta, u_D) du_D \\
g(p)
\]

- Derivative with respect to \( p \) is MTE.
- \( g'(p) = \text{MTE} \) and weights as before.
Understanding what linear IV estimates

- Under uniformity,

\[
\frac{\partial E(Y \mid P(Z) = p)}{\partial p} = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid U_D = u_D) = \Delta^{MTE}(u_D).
\]

- More generally, it is \( LIV = \frac{\partial E(Y \mid P(Z) = p)}{\partial p} \).

- Yitzhaki’s result does not rely on uniformity; true of any regression of \( Y \) on \( P \).

- Estimates a weighted net effect.

- The expression can be generalized.

- It produces Heckman-Vytlacil weights.
Understanding what linear IV estimates

- Under uniformity,
  
  \[
  \frac{\partial E(Y \mid P(Z) = p)}{\partial p} = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid U_D = u_D) = \Delta^{MTE}(u_D).
  \]

- More generally, it is \( LIV = \frac{\partial E(Y \mid P(Z) = p)}{\partial p} \).

  \[\text{Yitzhaki’s result does not rely on uniformity; true of any regression of } Y \text{ on } P.\]

  \[\text{Estimates a weighted net effect.}\]

  \[\text{The expression can be generalized.}\]

  \[\text{It produces Heckman-Vytlacil weights.}\]
Under uniformity,

\[
\frac{\partial E(Y \mid P(Z) = p)}{\partial p} = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid U_D = u_D) = \Delta^{MTE}(u_D).
\]

More generally, it is \( \text{LIV} = \frac{\partial E(Y \mid P(Z) = p)}{\partial p} \).

Yitzhaki’s result does not rely on uniformity; true of any regression of \( Y \) on \( P \).

Estimates a weighted net effect.

The expression can be generalized.

It produces Heckman-Vytlacil weights.
Understanding what linear IV estimates

- Under uniformity,

\[
\frac{\partial E(Y | P(Z) = p)}{\partial p} = E(Y_1 - Y_0 | U_D = u_D) = \Delta^{MTE}(u_D).
\]

- More generally, it is \(LIV = \frac{\partial E(Y|P(Z)=p)}{\partial p}\).

- Yitzhaki’s result does not rely on uniformity; true of any regression of \(Y\) on \(P\).

- Estimates a weighted net effect.

- The expression can be generalized.

- It produces Heckman-Vytlacil weights.
Understanding what linear IV estimates

- Under uniformity,

\[ \frac{\partial E(Y \mid P(Z) = p)}{\partial p} = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid U_D = u_D) = \Delta^{MTE}(u_D). \]

- More generally, it is LIV = \( \frac{\partial E(Y \mid P(Z) = p)}{\partial p} \).

- Yitzhaki’s result does not rely on uniformity; true of any regression of Y on P.

- Estimates a weighted net effect.

- The expression can be generalized.

- It produces Heckman-Vytlacil weights.
Under uniformity,

\[
\frac{\partial E(Y \mid P(Z) = p)}{\partial p} = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid U_D = u_D) = \Delta^{MTE}(u_D).
\]

More generally, it is \( \text{LIV} = \frac{\partial E(Y \mid P(Z) = p)}{\partial p} \).

Yitzhaki’s result does not rely on uniformity; true of any regression of \( Y \) on \( P \).

Estimates a weighted net effect.

The expression can be generalized.

It produces Heckman-Vytlacil weights.
Understanding what linear IV estimates

The Heckman-Vytlačil weight as a Yitzhaki weight

Proof.

\[
\text{Cov} ( J (Z), Y) = E \left( Y \cdot \tilde{J} \right) = E \left( E (Y \mid Z) \cdot \tilde{J} (Z) \right) \\
= E \left( E (Y \mid P(Z)) \cdot \tilde{J} (Z) \right) \\
= E \left( g (P(Z)) \cdot \tilde{J} (Z) \right). \\
\]

\[
\tilde{J} = J (Z) - E \left( J (Z) \mid P(Z) \geq u_D \right), \\
E (Y \mid P(Z)) = g (P(Z)).
\]
The Heckman-Vytacil weight as a Yitzhaki weight

\[ \text{Cov} (J(Z), Y) = \int_0^1 \int_{j}^{\bar{j}} g(u_D) \tilde{f}_P(J(u_D, j)) \, dj \, du_D \]

\[ = \int_0^1 g(u_D) \int_{j}^{\bar{j}} \tilde{f}_P(J(u_D, j)) \, dj \, du_D. \]
Understanding what linear IV estimates

The Heckman-Vytlacil weight as a Yitzhaki weight

cont.

Use integration by parts:

$$\text{Cov} (J (Z), Y)$$

$$= g (u_D) \int_0^{u_D} \int_0^J \tilde{j} f_{P, J} (p, j) \, dj \, dp \bigg|_0^1 - \int_0^1 g' (u_D) \int_0^{u_D} \int_0^J \tilde{j} f_{P, J} (p, j) \, dj \, dp \, du_D$$

$$= \int_0^{u_D} \int_0^1 \tilde{j} f_{P, J} (p, j) \, dj \, dp \, du_D$$

$$= \int_0^1 g' (u_D) E \left( \tilde{J} (Z) \mid P (Z) \geq u_D \right) \Pr (P (Z) \geq u_D) \, du_D.$$
Understanding what linear IV estimates

The Heckman-Vytlacil weight as a Yitzhaki weight

Thus:

\[ g'(u_D) = \left. \frac{\partial E(Y \mid P(Z) = p)}{\partial P(Z)} \right|_{p=u_D} = \Delta^{MTE}(u_D). \]
Understanding the structure of the IV weights

Recapitulate:

\[ \Delta_{IV}^J = \int \Delta^{MTE}(u_D) \omega_{IV}^J(u_D) \, du_D \]

\[ \omega_{IV}^J(u_D) = \frac{\int (j - E(J(Z)))) \int_{u_D}^{1} f_{J,P}(j, t) \, dt \, dj}{Cov(J(Z), D)} \tag{3.10} \]

- The weights are always positive if \( J(Z) \) is monotonic in the scalar \( Z \).
- In this case \( J(Z) \) and \( P(Z) \) have the same distribution and \( f_{J,P}(j, t) \) collapses to a single distribution.
Recapitulate:

\[
\Delta_{IV}^J = \int \Delta^{MTE}(u_D) \omega_{IV}^J(u_D) \, du_D
\]

\[
\omega_{IV}^J(u_D) = \frac{\int (j - E(J(Z))) \int_{u_D}^1 f_{J,P}(j, t) \, dt \, dj}{Cov(J(Z), D)}
\]

The weights are always positive if \( J(Z) \) is monotonic in the scalar \( Z \).

In this case \( J(Z) \) and \( P(Z) \) have the same distribution and \( f_{J,P}(j, t) \) collapses to a single distribution.
The possibility of negative weights arises when \( J(Z) \) is not a monotonic function of \( P(Z) \).

It can also arise when there are two or more instruments, and the analyst computes estimates with only one instrument or a combination of the \( Z \) instruments that is not a monotonic function of \( P(Z) \) so that \( J(Z) \) and \( P(Z) \) are not perfectly dependent.
The possibility of negative weights arises when $J(Z)$ is not a monotonic function of $P(Z)$.

It can also arise when there are two or more instruments, and the analyst computes estimates with only one instrument or a combination of the $Z$ instruments that is not a monotonic function of $P(Z)$ so that $J(Z)$ and $P(Z)$ are not perfectly dependent.
The weights can be constructed from data on \((J, P, D)\).

- Data on \((J(Z), P(Z))\) pairs and \((J(Z), D)\) pairs (for each \(X\) value) are all that is required.
The weights can be constructed from data on \((J, P, D)\).

Data on \((J(Z), P(Z))\) pairs and \((J(Z), D)\) pairs (for each \(X\) value) are all that is required.
Understanding the structure of the IV weights

**Discrete instruments** $J(Z)$

**Discrete Case**

- Support of the distribution of $P(Z)$ contains a finite number of values $p_1 < p_2 < \cdots < p_K$.

- Support of the instrument $J(Z)$ is also discrete, taking $I$ distinct values.

- $E(J(Z)|P(Z) \geq u_D)$ is constant in $u_D$ for $u_D$ within any $(p_\ell, p_{\ell+1})$ interval, and $\Pr(P(Z) \geq u_D)$ is constant in $u_D$ for $u_D$ within any $(p_\ell, p_{\ell+1})$ interval.

- Let $\lambda_\ell$ denote the weight on the LATE for the interval $(p_\ell, p_{\ell+1})$. 
Understanding the structure of the IV weights

Discrete instruments \( J(Z) \)

**Discrete Case**

- Support of the distribution of \( P(Z) \) contains a finite number of values \( p_1 < p_2 < \cdots < p_K \).

- Support of the instrument \( J(Z) \) is also discrete, taking \( I \) distinct values.

- \( E(J(Z)|P(Z) \geq u_D) \) is constant in \( u_D \) for \( u_D \) within any \((p_\ell, p_{\ell+1})\) interval, and \( \Pr(P(Z) \geq u_D) \) is constant in \( u_D \) for \( u_D \) within any \((p_\ell, p_{\ell+1})\) interval.

- Let \( \lambda_\ell \) denote the weight on the LATE for the interval \((p_\ell, p_{\ell+1})\).
Understanding the structure of the IV weights

**Discrete instruments $J(Z)$**

**Discrete Case**

- Support of the distribution of $P(Z)$ contains a finite number of values $p_1 < p_2 < \cdots < p_K$.
- Support of the instrument $J(Z)$ is also discrete, taking $I$ distinct values.
- $E(J(Z)|P(Z) \geq u_D)$ is constant in $u_D$ for $u_D$ within any $(p_\ell, p_{\ell+1})$ interval, and $\Pr(P(Z) \geq u_D)$ is constant in $u_D$ for $u_D$ within any $(p_\ell, p_{\ell+1})$ interval.
- Let $\lambda_\ell$ denote the weight on the LATE for the interval $(p_\ell, p_{\ell+1})$. 
Discrete Case

- Support of the distribution of $P(Z)$ contains a finite number of values $p_1 < p_2 < \cdots < p_K$.

- Support of the instrument $J(Z)$ is also discrete, taking $I$ distinct values.

- $E(J(Z)|P(Z) \geq u_D)$ is constant in $u_D$ for $u_D$ within any $(p_\ell, p_{\ell+1})$ interval, and $\Pr(P(Z) \geq u_D)$ is constant in $u_D$ for $u_D$ within any $(p_\ell, p_{\ell+1})$ interval.

- Let $\lambda_\ell$ denote the weight on the LATE for the interval $(p_\ell, p_{\ell+1})$. 

Understanding the structure of the IV weights

**Discrete instruments** \( J(Z) \)

- Under monotonicity, or uniformity

\[
\Delta_{IV}^J = \int E(Y_1 - Y_0|U_D = u_D)\omega_{IV}^J(u_D) \, du_D
\]

\[
= \sum_{\ell=1}^{K-1} \lambda_{\ell} \int_{p_{\ell}}^{p_{\ell+1}} E(Y_1 - Y_0|U_D = u_D) \frac{1}{(p_{\ell+1} - p_{\ell})} \, du_D
\]

\[
= \sum_{\ell=1}^{K-1} \Delta^{LATE}(p_{\ell}, p_{\ell+1}) \lambda_{\ell}.
\]
Understanding the structure of the IV weights

**Discrete instruments \( J(Z) \)**

Let \( j_i \) be the \( i^{th} \) smallest value of the support of \( J(Z) \).

\[
\lambda_{\ell} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} (j_i - E(J(Z)))) \sum_{t>\ell}^{K} (f(j_i, p_t))}{\text{Cov}(J(Z), D)(p_{\ell+1} - p_{\ell})} \tag{3.12}
\]
Understanding the structure of the IV weights

Discrete instruments $J(Z)$

- In general, this formula is true, under index sufficiency even if monotonicity is violated.
- It’s certainly true under (A-1)–(A-5).
- True where $\Delta^{LATE}(p_\ell, p_{\ell+1})$ is replaced by the Wald estimator, based on $P(z_\ell), \ell = 1, \ldots, L$, instruments.
- Observe, LATE here defined in terms of $P(Z)$, the “natural” instrument.
Understanding the structure of the IV weights

Discrete instruments \( J(Z) \)

- In general, this formula is true, under index sufficiency even if monotonicity is violated.
- It’s certainly true under (A-1)–(A-5).
- True where \( \Delta^{LATE} (p_\ell, p_{\ell+1}) \) is replaced by the Wald estimator, based on \( P(z_\ell) \), \( \ell = 1, \ldots, L \), instruments.
- Observe, LATE here defined in terms of \( P(Z) \), the “natural” instrument.
Discrete instruments $J(Z)$

- In general, this formula is true, under index sufficiency even if monotonicity is violated.

- It’s certainly true under (A-1)–(A-5).

- True where $\Delta^{LATE}(p_\ell, p_{\ell+1})$ is replaced by the Wald estimator, based on $P(z_\ell)$, $\ell = 1, \ldots, L$, instruments.

- Observe, LATE here defined in terms of $P(Z)$, the “natural” instrument.
In general, this formula is true, under index sufficiency even if monotonicity is violated.

It’s certainly true under (A-1)–(A-5).

True where \( \Delta^{LATE} (p_{\ell}, p_{\ell+1}) \) is replaced by the Wald estimator, based on \( P(z_{\ell}) \), \( \ell = 1, \ldots, L \), instruments.

Observe, LATE here defined in terms of \( P(Z) \), the “natural” instrument.
Understanding the structure of the IV weights

**Discrete instruments $J(Z)$**

- Generalizes the expression presented by Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Yitzhaki (1989, 1996)
- Their analysis of the case of vector $Z$ only considers the case where $J(Z)$ and $P(Z)$ are perfectly dependent because $J(Z)$ is a monotonic function of $P(Z)$.
- More generally, the weights can be positive or negative for any $\ell$ but they must sum to 1 over the $\ell$. 
Understanding the structure of the IV weights

Discrete instruments $J(Z)$

- Generalizes the expression presented by Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Yitzhaki (1989, 1996)

- Their analysis of the case of vector $Z$ only considers the case where $J(Z)$ and $P(Z)$ are perfectly dependent because $J(Z)$ is a monotonic function of $P(Z)$.

- More generally, the weights can be positive or negative for any $\ell$ but they must sum to 1 over the $\ell$. 
Understanding the structure of the IV weights

**Discrete instruments** $J(Z)$

- Generalizes the expression presented by Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Yitzhaki (1989, 1996)

- Their analysis of the case of vector $Z$ only considers the case where $J(Z)$ and $P(Z)$ are perfectly dependent because $J(Z)$ is a monotonic function of $P(Z)$.

- More generally, the weights can be positive or *negative* for any $\ell$ but they must sum to 1 over the $\ell$. 
For the IV weight to be correctly constructed and interpreted, we need to know the correct model for \( P(Z) \).

IV depends on:

1. the choice of the instrument \( J(Z) \),
2. its dependence with \( P(Z) \),
3. the specification of the propensity score (i.e., what variables go into \( Z \)).

“Structural” LATE or MTE identified by \( P(Z) \).

Can derive all other instrumental variable estimators in terms of weighted averages of MTE or LATE.
For the IV weight to be correctly constructed and interpreted, we need to know the correct model for \( P(Z) \).

IV depends on:

1. the choice of the instrument \( J(Z) \),
2. its dependence with \( P(Z) \),
3. the specification of the propensity score (i.e., what variables go into \( Z \)).

“Structural” LATE or MTE identified by \( P(Z) \).

Can derive all other instrumental variable estimators in terms of weighted averages of MTE or LATE.
The central role of the propensity score

For the IV weight to be correctly constructed and interpreted, we need to know the correct model for $P(Z)$.

IV depends on:

1. the choice of the instrument $J(Z)$,
2. its dependence with $P(Z)$,
3. the specification of the propensity score (i.e., what variables go into $Z$).

“Structural” LATE or MTE identified by $P(Z)$.

Can derive all other instrumental variable estimators in terms of weighted averages of MTE or LATE.
For the IV weight to be correctly constructed and interpreted, we need to know the correct model for $P(Z)$.

IV depends on:

1. the choice of the instrument $J(Z)$,
2. its dependence with $P(Z)$,
3. the specification of the propensity score (i.e., what variables go into $Z$).

“Structural” LATE or MTE identified by $P(Z)$.

Can derive all other instrumental variable estimators in terms of weighted averages of MTE or LATE.
For the IV weight to be correctly constructed and interpreted, we need to know the correct model for $P(Z)$.

IV depends on:

1. the choice of the instrument $J(Z)$,
2. its dependence with $P(Z)$,
3. the specification of the propensity score (i.e., what variables go into $Z$).

“Structural” LATE or MTE identified by $P(Z)$.

Can derive all other instrumental variable estimators in terms of weighted averages of MTE or LATE.
The central role of the propensity score

- For the IV weight to be correctly constructed and interpreted, we need to know the correct model for $P(Z)$.

- IV depends on:
  1. the choice of the instrument $J(Z)$,
  2. its dependence with $P(Z)$,
  3. the specification of the propensity score (i.e., what variables go into $Z$).

- “Structural” LATE or MTE identified by $P(Z)$.

- Can derive all other instrumental variable estimators in terms of weighted averages of MTE or LATE.
For the IV weight to be correctly constructed and interpreted, we need to know the correct model for $P(Z)$.

IV depends on:

1. the choice of the instrument $J(Z)$,
2. its dependence with $P(Z)$,
3. the specification of the propensity score (i.e., what variables go into $Z$).

“Structural” LATE or MTE identified by $P(Z)$.

Can derive all other instrumental variable estimators in terms of weighted averages of MTE or LATE.
Monotonicity or uniformity condition (IV-3) rules out general heterogeneous responses to treatment choices in response to changes in $Z$.

The recent literature on instrumental variables with heterogeneous responses is asymmetric.

The uniformity condition can be violated even when all components of $\gamma$ are of the same sign if $Z$ is a vector and $\gamma$ is a nondegenerate random variable.

$$D = 1[\gamma Z > \gamma]$$
Monotonicity or uniformity condition (IV-3) rules out general heterogeneous responses to treatment choices in response to changes in $Z$.

The recent literature on instrumental variables with heterogeneous responses is asymmetric.

The uniformity condition can be violated even when all components of $\gamma$ are of the same sign if $Z$ is a vector and $\gamma$ is a nondegenerate random variable.

$$D = 1_{[\gamma Z > \gamma]}$$
Monotonicity or uniformity condition (IV-3) rules out general heterogeneous responses to treatment choices in response to changes in $Z$.

The recent literature on instrumental variables with heterogeneous responses is asymmetric.

The uniformity condition can be violated even when all components of $\gamma$ are of the same sign if $Z$ is a vector and $\gamma$ is a nondegenerate random variable.

$$D = 1[\gamma Z > \gamma]$$
Uniformity is a condition on a vector.

Changing one coordinate of $Z$, holding the other coordinates at different values across people, will not necessarily produce uniformity.

Let $\mu_D(z) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 z_1 + \gamma_2 z_2 + \gamma_3 z_1 z_2$, where $\gamma_0$, $\gamma_1$, $\gamma_2$ and $\gamma_3$ are constants.

Consider changing $z_1$ from a common base state while holding $z_2$ fixed at different values across people.

If $\gamma_3 < 0$ then $\mu_D(z)$ does not necessarily satisfy the uniformity condition.
• Uniformity is a condition on a vector.

• Changing one coordinate of $Z$, holding the other coordinates at different values across people, will not necessarily produce uniformity.

• Let $\mu_D (z) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 z_1 + \gamma_2 z_2 + \gamma_3 z_1 z_2$, where $\gamma_0$, $\gamma_1$, $\gamma_2$ and $\gamma_3$ are constants.

• Consider changing $z_1$ from a common base state while holding $z_2$ fixed at different values across people.

• If $\gamma_3 < 0$ then $\mu_D (z)$ does not necessarily satisfy the uniformity condition.
Uniformity is a condition on a vector.

Changing one coordinate of $Z$, holding the other coordinates at different values across people, will not necessarily produce uniformity.

Let $\mu_D(z) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 z_1 + \gamma_2 z_2 + \gamma_3 z_1 z_2$, where $\gamma_0$, $\gamma_1$, $\gamma_2$ and $\gamma_3$ are constants.

Consider changing $z_1$ from a common base state while holding $z_2$ fixed at different values across people.

If $\gamma_3 < 0$ then $\mu_D(z)$ does not necessarily satisfy the uniformity condition.
Uniformity is a condition on a vector.

Changing one coordinate of $Z$, holding the other coordinates at different values across people, will not necessarily produce uniformity.

Let $\mu_D (z) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 z_1 + \gamma_2 z_2 + \gamma_3 z_1 z_2$, where $\gamma_0$, $\gamma_1$, $\gamma_2$ and $\gamma_3$ are constants.

Consider changing $z_1$ from a common base state while holding $z_2$ fixed at different values across people.

If $\gamma_3 < 0$ then $\mu_D (z)$ does not necessarily satisfy the uniformity condition.
Uniformity is a condition on a vector.

Changing one coordinate of $Z$, holding the other coordinates at different values across people, will not necessarily produce uniformity.

Let $\mu_D (z) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 z_1 + \gamma_2 z_2 + \gamma_3 z_1 z_2$, where $\gamma_0$, $\gamma_1$, $\gamma_2$ and $\gamma_3$ are constants.

Consider changing $z_1$ from a common base state while holding $z_2$ fixed at different values across people.

If $\gamma_3 < 0$ then $\mu_D (z)$ does not necessarily satisfy the uniformity condition.
Positive weights and uniformity are distinct issues.

Under uniformity, and assumptions (A-1)–(A-5), the weights on MTE or LIV for any particular instrument may be positive or negative.
Positive weights and uniformity are distinct issues.

Under uniformity, and assumptions (A-1)–(A-5), the weights on MTE or LIV for any particular instrument may be positive or negative.
If we condition on $Z_2 = z_2, \ldots, Z_K = z_K$ using $Z_1$ as an instrument, then uniformity is satisfied.

Effectively convert the problem back to that of a scalar instrument where the weights must be positive.

The concept of conditioning on other instruments to produce positive weights for the selected instrument is a new idea.
Monotonicity, uniformity and conditional instruments

- If we condition on $Z_2 = z_2, \ldots, Z_K = z_K$ using $Z_1$ as an instrument, then uniformity is satisfied.

- Effectively convert the problem back to that of a scalar instrument where the weights must be positive.

- The concept of conditioning on other instruments to produce positive weights for the selected instrument is a new idea.
If we condition on $Z_2 = z_2, \ldots, Z_K = z_K$ using $Z_1$ as an instrument, then uniformity is satisfied.

Effectively convert the problem back to that of a scalar instrument where the weights must be positive.

The concept of conditioning on other instruments to produce positive weights for the selected instrument is a new idea.
Monotonicity and weights

- Monotonicity is a property needed to get treatment effects with just two values of \( Z \), \( Z = z_1 \) and \( Z = z_2 \), to guarantee that IV estimates a treatment effect.

- With multiple values of \( Z \) we need to weight to produce linear IV.

- If our IV shifts \( P(Z) \) in same way for everyone, it shifts \( D \) in the same way for everyone,

\[
D = 1 [P(Z) \geq U_D]
\]
Monotonicity and weights

- Monotonicity is a property needed to get treatment effects with just two values of $Z$, $Z = z_1$ and $Z = z_2$, to guarantee that IV estimates a treatment effect.

- With multiple values of $Z$ we need to weight to produce linear IV.

- If our IV shifts $P(Z)$ in same way for everyone, it shifts $D$ in the same way for everyone,

$$D = 1[P(Z) \geq U_D].$$
Monotonicity and weights

- Monotonicity is a property needed to get treatment effects with just two values of $Z$, $Z = z_1$ and $Z = z_2$, to guarantee that IV estimates a treatment effect.

- With multiple values of $Z$ we need to weight to produce linear IV.

- If our IV shifts $P(Z)$ in same way for everyone, it shifts $D$ in the same way for everyone,

$$D = 1 [P(Z) \geq U_D].$$
If $P(Z)$ is instrument, monotonicity is obviously satisfied.

If $J(Z)$ is an instrument and not a monotonic function of $P(Z)$, may not shift $P(Z)$ in same way for all people.

We can get two-way flows if, e.g., we use only one $Z$ or else have a random coefficient model,

$$D = 1[\gamma Z \geq V].$$

Negative weights are a tip off of two-way flows.
If $P(Z)$ is instrument, monotonicity is obviously satisfied.

If $J(Z)$ is an instrument and not a monotonic function of $P(Z)$, may not shift $P(Z)$ in same way for all people.

- We can get two-way flows if, e.g., we use only one $Z$ or else have a random coefficient model,

$$D = 1[\gamma Z \geq V].$$

- Negative weights are a tip off of two-way flows.
If $P(Z)$ is instrument, monotonicity is obviously satisfied.

If $J(Z)$ is an instrument and not a monotonic function of $P(Z)$, may not shift $P(Z)$ in same way for all people.

We can get two-way flows if, e.g., we use only one $Z$ or else have a random coefficient model,

$$D = 1[\gamma Z \geq V].$$

Negative weights are a tip off of two-way flows.
Monotonicity and weights

- If $P(Z)$ is instrument, monotonicity is obviously satisfied.
- If $J(Z)$ is an instrument and not a monotonic function of $P(Z)$, may not shift $P(Z)$ in same way for all people.
- We can get two-way flows if, e.g., we use only one $Z$ or else have a random coefficient model,

$$D = 1[\gamma Z \geq V].$$

- Negative weights are a tip off of two-way flows.
Monotonicity and weights

- If we do not want a treatment effect, who cares?
- We do not always want a treatment effect.
- Go back to ask “What economic question am I trying to answer?”
If we do not want a treatment effect, who cares?

We do not always want a treatment effect.

Go back to ask “What economic question am I trying to answer?”
If we do not want a treatment effect, who cares?

We do not always want a treatment effect.

Go back to ask “What economic question am I trying to answer?”
Even if uniformity condition (IV-3) fails, IV may answer relevant policy questions.

IV or TSLS estimates a weighted average of marginal responses which may be pointwise positive or negative.

Policies may induce some people to switch into and others to switch out of choices.

Net effects are sometimes of interest in many policy analyses.
Even if uniformity condition (IV-3) fails, IV may answer relevant policy questions.

IV or TSLS estimates a weighted average of marginal responses which may be pointwise positive or negative.

Policies may induce some people to switch into and others to switch out of choices.

Net effects are sometimes of interest in many policy analyses.
Even if uniformity condition (IV-3) fails, IV may answer relevant policy questions.

IV or TSLS estimates a weighted average of marginal responses which may be pointwise positive or negative.

Policies may induce some people to switch into and others to switch out of choices.

Net effects are sometimes of interest in many policy analyses.
Even if uniformity condition (IV-3) fails, IV may answer relevant policy questions.

IV or TSLS estimates a weighted average of marginal responses which may be pointwise positive or negative.

Policies may induce some people to switch into and others to switch out of choices.

Net effects are sometimes of interest in many policy analyses.
Thus, subsidized housing in a region supported by higher taxes may attract some to migrate to the region and cause others to leave. The net effect on earnings from the policy is all that is required to perform cost benefit calculations of the policy on outcomes.

If the housing subsidy is the instrument, the issue of monotonicity is a red herring.

If the subsidy is exogenously imposed, IV estimates the net effect of the policy on mean outcomes.

Only if the effect of migration induced by the subsidy on outcomes is the question of interest, and not the effect of the subsidy, does uniformity emerge as an interesting question.
Thus, subsidized housing in a region supported by higher taxes may attract some to migrate to the region and cause others to leave. The net effect on earnings from the policy is all that is required to perform cost benefit calculations of the policy on outcomes.

If the housing subsidy is the instrument, the issue of monotonicity is a red herring.

If the subsidy is exogenously imposed, IV estimates the net effect of the policy on mean outcomes.

Only if the effect of migration induced by the subsidy on outcomes is the question of interest, and not the effect of the subsidy, does uniformity emerge as an interesting question.
Thus, subsidized housing in a region supported by higher taxes may attract some to migrate to the region and cause others to leave. The net effect on earnings from the policy is all that is required to perform cost benefit calculations of the policy on outcomes.

If the housing subsidy is the instrument, the issue of monotonicity is a red herring.

If the subsidy is exogenously imposed, IV estimates the net effect of the policy on mean outcomes.

Only if the effect of migration induced by the subsidy on outcomes is the question of interest, and not the effect of the subsidy, does uniformity emerge as an interesting question.
Treatment effects vs. policy effects

- Thus, subsidized housing in a region supported by higher taxes may attract some to migrate to the region and cause others to leave. The net effect on earnings from the policy is all that is required to perform cost benefit calculations of the policy on outcomes.

- If the housing subsidy is the instrument, the issue of monotonicity is a red herring.

- If the subsidy is exogenously imposed, IV estimates the net effect of the policy on mean outcomes.

- Only if the effect of migration induced by the subsidy on outcomes is the question of interest, and not the effect of the subsidy, does uniformity emerge as an interesting question.
Comparing selection and IV models

- Angrist and Krueger (1999) compare IV with selection models and view the former with favor.

- Useful to understand this comparison in a model with essential heterogeneity.

- IV is estimating the derivative (or finite changes) of the parameters of a selection model.

- IV only conditions on $Z$ (and $X$).
Comparing selection and IV models

- Angrist and Krueger (1999) compare IV with selection models and view the former with favor.

- Useful to understand this comparison in a model with essential heterogeneity.

- IV is estimating the derivative (or finite changes) of the parameters of a selection model.

- IV only conditions on Z (and X).
Comparing selection and IV models

- Angrist and Krueger (1999) compare IV with selection models and view the former with favor.

- Useful to understand this comparison in a model with essential heterogeneity.

- IV is estimating the derivative (or finite changes) of the parameters of a selection model.

- IV only conditions on $Z$ (and $X$).
Comparing selection and IV models

- Angrist and Krueger (1999) compare IV with selection models and view the former with favor.

- Useful to understand this comparison in a model with essential heterogeneity.

- IV is estimating the derivative (or finite changes) of the parameters of a selection model.

- IV only conditions on $Z$ (and $X$).
Comparing selection and IV models

- The control function approach conditions on $Z$ and $D$ (and $X$).
- From index sufficiency, equivalent to conditioning on $P(Z)$ and $D$:

\[
E(Y \mid X, D, Z) = \mu_0(X) + [\mu_1(X) - \mu_0(X)] D \\
+ K_1(P(Z), X) D + K_0(P(Z), X) (1 - D)
\]  

\[
K_1(P(Z), X) = E(U_1 \mid D = 1, X, P(Z))
\]

and

\[
K_0(P(Z), X) = E(U_0 \mid D = 0, X, P(Z)).
\]
Comparing selection and IV models

- The control function approach conditions on $Z$ and $D$ (and $X$).
- From index sufficiency, equivalent to conditioning on $P(Z)$ and $D$:

$$E(Y | X, D, Z) = \mu_0(X) + [\mu_1(X) - \mu_0(X)]D + K_1(P(Z), X)D + K_0(P(Z), X)(1-D) \quad (4.1)$$

$$K_1(P(Z), X) = E(U_1 | D = 1, X, P(Z))$$

and

$$K_0(P(Z), X) = E(U_0 | D = 0, X, P(Z)).$$
Comparing selection and IV models

- IV approach does not condition on $D$.
- It works with the integral (over $D$) of (4.1).

$$E(Y | X, P(Z)) = \mu_0(X) + [\mu_1(X) - \mu_0(X)] P(Z)$$

$$+ K_1(P(Z), X) P(Z) + K_0(P(Z), X) (1 - P(Z))$$

Under monotonicity and (A-1)–(A-5)

$$\frac{\partial E(Y | X, P(Z))}{\partial P(Z)} \bigg|_{P(Z)=p} = \text{LIV}(X, p) = \text{MTE}(X, p).$$

- Control function builds up MTE from components.
- IV gets it in one fell swoop.
Comparing selection and IV models

- IV approach does not condition on $D$.
- It works with the integral (over $D$) of (4.1).

\[
E (Y \mid X, P(Z)) = \mu_0 (X) + [\mu_1 (X) - \mu_0 (X)] P(Z) \\
+ K_1 (P(Z), X) P(Z) + K_0 (P(Z), X) (1 - P(Z))
\]

Under monotonicity and (A-1)–(A-5)

\[
\left. \frac{\partial E(Y \mid X, P(Z))}{\partial P(Z)} \right|_{P(Z) = p} = \text{LIV} (X, p) = \text{MTE} (X, p).
\]

- Control function builds up MTE from components.
- IV gets it in one fell swoop.
Comparing selection and IV models

- IV approach does not condition on $D$.
- It works with the integral (over $D$) of (4.1).

\[
E(Y \mid X, P(Z)) = \mu_0(X) + [\mu_1(X) - \mu_0(X)] P(Z) \\
+ K_1(P(Z), X) P(Z) + K_0(P(Z), X) (1 - P(Z))
\]

(4.2)

Under monotonicity and (A-1)–(A-5)

\[
\frac{\partial E(Y \mid X, P(Z))}{\partial P(Z)} \bigg|_{P(Z)=p} = \text{LIV} (X, p) = \text{MTE} (X, p).
\]

- Control function builds up MTE from components.
- IV gets it in one fell swoop.
Comparing selection and IV models

- IV approach does not condition on $D$.
- It works with the integral (over $D$) of (4.1).

\[
E(Y \mid X, P(Z)) = \mu_0(X) + [\mu_1(X) - \mu_0(X)] P(Z)
+ K_1(P(Z), X) P(Z) + K_0(P(Z), X) (1 - P(Z))
\]

Under monotonicity and (A-1)–(A-5)

\[
\frac{\partial E(Y \mid X, P(Z))}{\partial P(Z)} \bigg|_{P(Z)=p} = \text{LIV}(X, p) = \text{MTE}(X, p).
\]

- Control function builds up MTE from components.
- IV gets it in one fell swoop.
Comparing selection and IV models

- With rank and limit conditions (Heckman and Robb, 1985; Heckman, 1990), using control functions, one can identify $\mu_1(X)$, $\mu_0(X)$, $K_1(P(Z), X)$, and $K_0(P(Z), X)$.

- The selection (control function) estimator identifies the conditional means

\[
E(Y_1 | X, P(Z), D = 1) = \mu_1(X) + K_1(X, P(Z)) \quad (4.3a)
\]

and

\[
E(Y_0 | X, P(Z), D = 0) = \mu_0(X) + K_0(X, P(Z)). \quad (4.3b)
\]
Comparing selection and IV models

- With rank and limit conditions (Heckman and Robb, 1985; Heckman, 1990), using control functions, one can identify $\mu_1(X)$, $\mu_0(X)$, $K_1(P(Z), X)$, and $K_0(P(Z), X)$.

- The selection (control function) estimator identifies the conditional means

$$E(Y_1 | X, P(Z), D = 1) = \mu_1(X) + K_1(X, P(Z)) \quad (4.3a)$$

and

$$E(Y_0 | X, P(Z), D = 0) = \mu_0(X) + K_0(X, P(Z)). \quad (4.3b)$$
Comparing selection and IV models

- To decompose these means and separate $\mu_1(X)$ from $K_1(X, P(Z))$ without invoking functional form assumptions, it is necessary to have an exclusion (a $Z$ not in $X$).

- This allows $\mu_1(X)$ and $K_1(X, P(Z))$ to be independently varied with respect to each other.

- We can also invoke curvature conditions without exclusion of variables. (Heckman and Navarro, 2006)

- In addition there must exist a limit set for $Z$ given $X$ such that $K_1(X, P(Z)) = 0$ for $Z$ in that limit set.
Comparing selection and IV models

- To decompose these means and separate $\mu_1(X)$ from $K_1(X, P(Z))$ without invoking functional form assumptions, it is necessary to have an exclusion (a $Z$ not in $X$).

- This allows $\mu_1(X)$ and $K_1(X, P(Z))$ to be independently varied with respect to each other.

- We can also invoke curvature conditions without exclusion of variables. (Heckman and Navarro, 2006)

- In addition there must exist a limit set for $Z$ given $X$ such that $K_1(X, P(Z)) = 0$ for $Z$ in that limit set.
Comparing selection and IV models

To decompose these means and separate $\mu_1 (X)$ from $K_1 (X, P(Z))$ without invoking functional form assumptions, it is necessary to have an exclusion (a $Z$ not in $X$).

This allows $\mu_1 (X)$ and $K_1 (X, P(Z))$ to be independently varied with respect to each other.

We can also invoke curvature conditions without exclusion of variables. (Heckman and Navarro, 2006)

In addition there must exist a limit set for $Z$ given $X$ such that $K_1 (X, P(Z)) = 0$ for $Z$ in that limit set.
Comparing selection and IV models

- To decompose these means and separate $\mu_1(X)$ from $K_1(X, P(Z))$ without invoking functional form assumptions, it is necessary to have an exclusion (a $Z$ not in $X$).

- This allows $\mu_1(X)$ and $K_1(X, P(Z))$ to be independently varied with respect to each other.

- We can also invoke curvature conditions without exclusion of variables. (Heckman and Navarro, 2006)

- In addition there must exist a limit set for $Z$ given $X$ such that $K_1(X, P(Z)) = 0$ for $Z$ in that limit set.
Limit set not required for selection model if we are interested only in MTE or LATE.

Not required in IV either if we only seek MTE or LATE.
Limit set not required for selection model if we are interested only in MTE or LATE.

Not required in IV either if we only seek MTE or LATE.
Comparing selection and IV models

- Without functional form assumptions, it is not possible to disentangle $\mu_1(X)$ from $K_1(X, P(Z))$ which may contain constants and functions of $X$ that do not interact with $P(Z)$ (see Heckman (1990)).

- These limit set arguments are needed for ATE or TT, not LATE or LIV.
Comparing selection and IV models

- Without functional form assumptions, it is not possible to disentangle $\mu_1(X)$ from $K_1(X, P(Z))$ which may contain constants and functions of $X$ that do not interact with $P(Z)$ (see Heckman (1990)).

- These limit set arguments are needed for ATE or TT, not LATE or LIV.
**IV method**

- IV method works with derivatives of (4.2) and not levels.

- Cannot directly recover the constant terms in (4.3a) and (4.3b).
IV method

- IV method works with derivatives of (4.2) and not levels.
- Cannot directly recover the constant terms in (4.3a) and (4.3b).
In summary, the control function method directly identifies levels while the LIV approach works with slopes.

Constants that do not depend on \( P(Z) \) disappear from the LIV estimates of the model.
In summary, the control function method directly identifies levels while the LIV approach works with slopes.

Constants that do not depend on $P(Z)$ disappear from the LIV estimates of the model.
IV method

- The distributions of $U_1$, $U_0$ and $V$ do not need to be specified to estimate control function models (see Powell, 1994).

- In particular, there is no reliance on normality.
The distributions of $U_1$, $U_0$ and $V$ do not need to be specified to estimate control function models (see Powell, 1994).

In particular, there is no reliance on normality.
Support problems for IV

- Support conditions with control function models have their counterparts in IV models.

- One common criticism of selection models is that without invoking functional form assumptions, identification of $\mu_1(X)$ and $\mu_0(X)$ requires that $P(Z) \rightarrow 1$ and $P(Z) \rightarrow 0$ in limit sets.

- Identification in limit sets is sometimes called “identification at infinity.”

- In order to identify $\text{ATE} = E(Y_1 - Y_0|X)$, IV methods also require that $P(Z) \rightarrow 1$ and $P(Z) \rightarrow 0$ in limit sets, so an identification at infinity argument is implicit when IV is used to identify this parameter.
Support problems for IV

- Support conditions with control function models have their counterparts in IV models.

- One common criticism of selection models is that without invoking functional form assumptions, identification of $\mu_1(X)$ and $\mu_0(X)$ requires that $P(Z) \to 1$ and $P(Z) \to 0$ in limit sets.

- Identification in limit sets is sometimes called “identification at infinity.”

- In order to identify $ATE = E(Y_1 - Y_0 | X)$, IV methods also require that $P(Z) \to 1$ and $P(Z) \to 0$ in limit sets, so an identification at infinity argument is implicit when IV is used to identify this parameter.
Support problems for IV

- Support conditions with control function models have their counterparts in IV models.

- One common criticism of selection models is that without invoking functional form assumptions, identification of \( \mu_1(X) \) and \( \mu_0(X) \) requires that \( P(Z) \to 1 \) and \( P(Z) \to 0 \) in limit sets.

- Identification in limit sets is sometimes called “identification at infinity.”

- In order to identify \( \text{ATE} = E(Y_1 - Y_0 | X) \), IV methods also require that \( P(Z) \to 1 \) and \( P(Z) \to 0 \) in limit sets, so an identification at infinity argument is implicit when IV is used to identify this parameter.
Support problems for IV

- Support conditions with control function models have their counterparts in IV models.

- One common criticism of selection models is that without invoking functional form assumptions, identification of $\mu_1(X)$ and $\mu_0(X)$ requires that $P(Z) \to 1$ and $P(Z) \to 0$ in limit sets.

- Identification in limit sets is sometimes called “identification at infinity.”

- In order to identify $\text{ATE} = E(Y_1 - Y_0 | X)$, IV methods also require that $P(Z) \to 1$ and $P(Z) \to 0$ in limit sets, so an identification at infinity argument is implicit when IV is used to identify this parameter.
Support problems for IV

- The LATE parameter avoids this problem by moving the goal posts and redefining the parameter of interest from a level parameter like ATE or TT to a slope parameter like LATE which differences out the unidentified constants.

- We can identify this parameter by selection models or IV models without invoking identification at infinity.
Support problems for IV

- The LATE parameter avoids this problem by moving the goal posts and redefining the parameter of interest from a level parameter like ATE or TT to a slope parameter like LATE which differences out the unidentified constants.

- We can identify this parameter by selection models or IV models without invoking identification at infinity.
Support problems for IV

- The IV estimator is model dependent, just like the selection estimator, but in application, the model does not have to be fully specified to obtain $\Delta^IV$ using $Z$ (or $J(Z)$).

- However the distribution of $P(Z)$ and the relationship between $P(Z)$ and $J(Z)$ generates the weights on MTE (or LIV).

- The interpretation placed on $\Delta^IV$ in terms of weights on $\Delta^{MTE}$ depends crucially on the specification of $P(Z)$. In both control function and IV approaches for the general model of heterogeneous responses, $P(Z)$ plays a central role.
Support problems for IV

- The IV estimator is model dependent, just like the selection estimator, but in application, the model does not have to be fully specified to obtain $\Delta^{IV}$ using $Z$ (or $J(Z)$).

- However the distribution of $P(Z)$ and the relationship between $P(Z)$ and $J(Z)$ generates the weights on MTE (or LIV).

- The interpretation placed on $\Delta^{IV}$ in terms of weights on $\Delta^{MTE}$ depends crucially on the specification of $P(Z)$. In both control function and IV approaches for the general model of heterogeneous responses, $P(Z)$ plays a central role.
Support problems for IV

- The IV estimator is model dependent, just like the selection estimator, but in application, the model does not have to be fully specified to obtain $\Delta^\text{IV}$ using $Z$ (or $J(Z)$).

- However the distribution of $P(Z)$ and the relationship between $P(Z)$ and $J(Z)$ generates the weights on MTE (or LIV).

- The interpretation placed on $\Delta^\text{IV}$ in terms of weights on $\Delta^\text{MTE}$ depends crucially on the specification of $P(Z)$. In both control function and IV approaches for the general model of heterogeneous responses, $P(Z)$ plays a central role.
Support problems for IV

- Two economists using the same instrument will obtain the same point estimate using the same data.

- Their *interpretation* of that estimate will differ depending on how they specify the arguments in $P(Z)$, even if neither uses $P(Z)$ as an instrument.

- By conditioning on $P(Z)$, the control function approach makes the dependence of estimates on the specification of $P(Z)$ explicit.

- The IV approach is less explicit and masks the assumptions required to economically interpret the empirical output of an IV estimation.
Support problems for IV

- Two economists using the same instrument will obtain the same point estimate using the same data.

- Their *interpretation* of that estimate will differ depending on how they specify the arguments in $P(Z)$, even if neither uses $P(Z)$ as an instrument.

- By conditioning on $P(Z)$, the control function approach makes the dependence of estimates on the specification of $P(Z)$ explicit.

- The IV approach is less explicit and masks the assumptions required to economically interpret the empirical output of an IV estimation.
Support problems for IV

- Two economists using the same instrument will obtain the same point estimate using the same data.

- Their *interpretation* of that estimate will differ depending on how they specify the arguments in $P(Z)$, even if neither uses $P(Z)$ as an instrument.

- By conditioning on $P(Z)$, the control function approach makes the dependence of estimates on the specification of $P(Z)$ explicit.

- The IV approach is less explicit and masks the assumptions required to economically interpret the empirical output of an IV estimation.
Support problems for IV

- Two economists using the same instrument will obtain the same point estimate using the same data.

- Their *interpretation* of that estimate will differ depending on how they specify the arguments in \( P(Z) \), even if neither uses \( P(Z) \) as an instrument.

- By conditioning on \( P(Z) \), the control function approach makes the dependence of estimates on the specification of \( P(Z) \) explicit.

- The IV approach is less explicit and masks the assumptions required to economically interpret the empirical output of an IV estimation.
Examples based on choice theory

- Suppose cost of adopting the policy $C$ is the same across all countries.
- Countries choose to adopt the policy if $D^* > 0$ where $D^*$ is the net benefit: $D^* = (Y_1 - Y_0 - C)$ and
- $ATE = E(\beta) = E(Y_1 - Y_0) = \mu_1 - \mu_0$
- Treatment on the treated is

\[
E(\beta \mid D = 1) = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D = 1) = \mu_1 - \mu_0 + E(U_1 - U_0 \mid D = 1).
\]
Examples based on choice theory

- Suppose cost of adopting the policy $C$ is the same across all countries.

- Countries choose to adopt the policy if $D^* > 0$ where $D^*$ is the net benefit: $D^* = (Y_1 - Y_0 - C)$ and

- $ATE = E(\beta) = E(Y_1 - Y_0) = \mu_1 - \mu_0$

- Treatment on the treated is

$$E(\beta \mid D = 1) = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D = 1) = \mu_1 - \mu_0 + E(U_1 - U_0 \mid D = 1).$$
Examples based on choice theory

- Suppose cost of adopting the policy $C$ is the same across all countries.

- Countries choose to adopt the policy if $D^* > 0$ where $D^*$ is the net benefit: $D^* = (Y_1 - Y_0 - C)$ and

  $ATE = E(\beta) = E(Y_1 - Y_0) = \mu_1 - \mu_0$

- Treatment on the treated is

  $$E(\beta \mid D = 1) = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D = 1) = \mu_1 - \mu_0 + E(U_1 - U_0 \mid D = 1).$$
Examples based on choice theory

- Suppose cost of adopting the policy $C$ is the same across all countries.

- Countries choose to adopt the policy if $D^* > 0$ where $D^*$ is the net benefit: $D^* = (Y_1 - Y_0 - C)$ and

- $ATE = E(\beta) = E(Y_1 - Y_0) = \mu_1 - \mu_0$

- Treatment on the treated is

$$E(\beta \mid D = 1) = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D = 1)$$
$$= \mu_1 - \mu_0 + E(U_1 - U_0 \mid D = 1).$$
Figure 1: distribution of gains

The Roy Economy

\[ U_1 - U_0 \sim D \]

\[
\beta = Y_1 - Y_0
\]

\[
TT = 2.666, \ TUT = -0.632
\]

Return to Marginal Agent = \( C = 1.5 \), ATE = \( \mu_1 - \mu_0 = \bar{\beta} = 0.2 \)
The model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Choice Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| \( Y_1 = \mu_1 + U_1 = \alpha + \beta + U_1 \) | \( D = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } D^* > 0 \\
0 & \text{if } D^* \leq 0 
\end{cases} \) |
| \( Y_0 = \mu_0 + U_0 = \alpha + U_0 \) | |

General Case

\( (U_1 - U_0) \not\perp D \)

\( ATE \neq TT \neq TUT \)
The model

The Researcher Observes \((Y, D, C)\)

\[ Y = \alpha + \beta D + U_0 \text{ where } \beta = Y_1 - Y_0 \]

Parameterization

\[ \alpha = 0.67 \quad (U_1, U_0) \sim N(0, \Sigma) \quad D^* = Y_1 - Y_0 - C \]

\[ \bar{\beta} = 0.2 \quad \Sigma = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & -0.9 \\ -0.9 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad C = 1.5 \]

- Let \( C = \gamma Z, \quad \gamma \geq 0. \)
Figure 4A: monotonicity, the extended Roy economy

Standard case

\[ z = (0,1) \]
\[ z' = (1,1) \]

\[ \gamma z \rightarrow \gamma z' \]

\[ \beta = Y_1 - Y_0 \]
Figure 4B: monotonicity, the extended Roy economy
Changing $Z_1$ without controlling for $Z_2$
Figure 4C: monotonicity, the extended Roy economy
Random coefficient case

\[ \gamma = (0.5, 0.5) \]
\[ \gamma = (-0.5, 0.5) \]
\[ z = (0, 1) \]
\[ z' = (1, 1) \]
Discrete instruments and the weights for LATE

**Figure 4: monotonicity, the extended Roy economy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Standard Case</th>
<th>B. Changing $Z_1$ without Controlling for $Z_2$</th>
<th>C. Random Coefficient Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| $z \rightarrow z'$  
$z = (0, 1)$ and $z' = (1, 1)$ | $z \rightarrow z'$ or $z \rightarrow z''$  
$z = (0, 1)$, $z' = (1, 1)$ and $z'' = (1, -1)$ | $z \rightarrow z'$  
$z = (0, 1)$ and $z' = (1, 1)$ |

$\gamma$ is a random vector  
$\tilde{\gamma} = (0.5, 0.5)$ and $\tilde{\gamma} = (-0.5, 0.5)$  
where $\tilde{\gamma}$ and $\tilde{\gamma}$ are two realizations of $\gamma$

$D(\gamma z) \geq D(\gamma z')$  
$D(\gamma z) \geq D(\gamma z')$ or $D(\gamma z) < D(\gamma z'')$  
$D(\tilde{\gamma} z) \geq D(\tilde{\gamma} z')$ and $D(\tilde{\gamma} z) < D(\tilde{\gamma} z')$

For all individuals  
Depending on the value of $z'$ or $z''$  
Depending on value of $\gamma$
Discrete instruments and the weights for LATE

**Figure 4: monotonicity, the extended Roy economy model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Choice Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Y_1 = \alpha + \bar{\beta} + U_1$</td>
<td>$D = \begin{cases} 1 &amp; \text{if } Y_1 - Y_0 - \gamma Z &gt; 0 \ 0 &amp; \text{if } Y_1 - Y_0 - \gamma Z \leq 0 \end{cases}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_0 = \alpha + U_0$</td>
<td>with $\gamma Z = \gamma_1 Z_1 + \gamma_2 Z_2$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Parameterization

$(U_1, U_0) \sim N(0, \Sigma), \quad \Sigma = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & -0.9 \\ -0.9 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \alpha = 0.67, \quad \bar{\beta} = 0.2,$

$\gamma = (0.5, 0.5)$ (except in Case C)

$Z_1 = \{-1, 0, 1\}$ and $Z_2 = \{-1, 0, 1\}$
Discrete instruments and the weights for LATE

Figure 5: IV weights and its components under discrete instruments when \( P(Z) \) is the instrument

\[
\Delta^{\text{LATE}} (p_\ell, p_{\ell+1}) = \frac{E(Y|P(Z) = p_{\ell+1}) - E(Y|P(Z) = p_\ell)}{p_{\ell+1} - p_\ell} \\
= \frac{\bar{\beta}(p_{\ell+1} - p_\ell) + \sigma_{U_1-U_0} \left( \phi \left( \Phi^{-1} (1 - p_{\ell+1}) \right) - \phi \left( \Phi^{-1} (1 - p_\ell) \right) \right)\}}{p_{\ell+1} - p_\ell}
\]

\[
\lambda_\ell = (p_{\ell+1} - p_\ell) \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{K} (p_i - E(P(Z))) \sum_{t>\ell} f(p_i, p_t)}{\text{Cov}(Z_1, D)}
\]

\[
= (p_{\ell+1} - p_\ell) \frac{\sum_{t>\ell} (p_t - E(P(Z))) f(p_t)}{\text{Cov}(Z_1, D)}
\]
Discrete instruments and the weights for LATE

**Joint probability distribution of \((Z_1, Z_2)\) and the propensity score**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Z_1 \backslash Z_2)</th>
<th>(-1)</th>
<th>(0)</th>
<th>(1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(-1)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.7309</td>
<td>0.6402</td>
<td>0.5409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.6402</td>
<td>0.5409</td>
<td>0.4388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.5409</td>
<td>0.4388</td>
<td>0.3408</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\text{Cov}(Z_1, Z_2) = -0.5468
\]

(joint probabilities in ordinary type \((\Pr(Z_1 = z_1, Z_2 = z_2))\);
propensity score in italics \((\Pr (D = 1|Z_1 = z_1, Z_2 = z_2)))\)
Figure 5: IV weights and its components under discrete instruments when $P(Z)$ is the instrument

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ATE} &= 0.2, \quad \text{TT} = 0.5942, \quad \text{TUT} = -0.4823 \\
\text{and} \\
\Delta_{IV}^P(Z) &= \sum_{\ell=1}^{K-1} \Delta_{LATE} (p_\ell, p_{\ell+1}) \lambda_\ell = -0.09
\end{align*}
\]
Discrete instruments and the weights for LATE

**Figure 5A: IV weights and its components under discrete instruments when $P(Z)$ is the instrument (IV Weights)**
Figure 5B: IV weights and its components under discrete instruments when \( P(Z) \) is the instrument \((E(P(Z) \mid P(Z) > p_{\ell}) \text{ and } E(P(Z)))\)

The Extended Roy Economy

A. IV Weights

B. \( E(P(Z)_{j} \mid P(Z) > p_{\ell}) \text{ and } E(P(Z)) \)

-0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

-0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

\( E(P(Z)) = 0.5663 \)

\( \text{C. Local Average Treatment Effects} \)

\( \text{D. LATE} \)

The model is the same as the one presented below Figure 2.

\[ \text{ATE} = 0.2, \quad \text{TT} = 0.5942, \quad \text{TUT} = -0.4823 \text{ and } -0.09 \]

\[ \text{LATE} (p_{\ell}; p_{\ell}+1) = E(Y_{j} \mid P(Z) = p_{\ell}+1) - E(Y_{j} \mid P(Z) = p_{\ell}) \]

\[ = (p_{\ell}+1 - p_{\ell}) + \theta U_{1} - \theta U_{0} \]

\[ = \theta (1 - p_{\ell}) - \theta (1 - p_{\ell+1}) \]

\[ = \theta (p_{\ell+1} - p_{\ell}) \]

\[ \text{Cov}(Z; D) = (p_{\ell}+1 - p_{\ell}) \text{ and } \text{Cov}(Z; D) \]

\[ \text{Joint Probability Distribution of} (Z_{1}; Z_{2}) \text{ and the Propensity Score} \]

(joint probabilities in ordinary type \((\text{Pr}(Z_{1} = z_{1}; Z_{2} = z_{2}))\); propensity score in italics \((\text{Pr}(D = 1 \mid Z_{1} = z_{1}; Z_{2} = z_{2}))\))

\[ \begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
0 & 0.3 & 0.01 & 0.03 \\
0.2 & 0.05 & 0.01 & 0.03 \\
0.4 & 0.01 & 0.03 & 0.01 \\
0.6 & 0.03 & 0.01 & 0.03 \\
0.8 & 0.01 & 0.03 & 0.01 \\
\end{array} \]
Discrete instruments and the weights for LATE

Figure 5C: IV weights and its components under discrete instruments when \( P(Z) \) is the instrument (Local average treatment effects)
Discrete instruments and the weights for LATE

Consider using \( Z_1 \) as instrument

- If \( Z_1 \) and \( Z_2 \) are negatively dependent and 
  \[ E(Z_1 \mid P(Z) > u_D) \] is not monotonic in \( u_D \), weights negative.

- This nonmonotonicity is evident in Figure 6B.

- This produces the pattern of negative weights shown in Figure 6A.

- Associated with two way flows.

- Two way flows are induced by uncontrolled variation in \( Z_2 \).
Consider using $Z_1$ as instrument

- If $Z_1$ and $Z_2$ are negatively dependent and $E(Z_1 \mid P(Z) > u_D)$ is not monotonic in $u_D$, weights negative.

- This nonmonotonicity is evident in Figure 6B.

- This produces the pattern of negative weights shown in Figure 6A.

- Associated with two way flows.

- Two way flows are induced by uncontrolled variation in $Z_2$. 
Consider using $Z_1$ as instrument

- If $Z_1$ and $Z_2$ are negatively dependent and $E(Z_1 \mid P(Z) > u_D)$ is not monotonic in $u_D$, weights negative.

- This nonmonotonicity is evident in Figure 6B.

- This produces the pattern of negative weights shown in Figure 6A.

- Associated with two way flows.

- Two way flows are induced by uncontrolled variation in $Z_2$. 
Consider using $Z_1$ as instrument

- If $Z_1$ and $Z_2$ are negatively dependent and $E(Z_1 \mid P(Z) > u_D)$ is not monotonic in $u_D$, weights negative.

- This nonmonotonicity is evident in Figure 6B.

- This produces the pattern of negative weights shown in Figure 6A.

- Associated with two way flows.

  Two way flows are induced by uncontrolled variation in $Z_2$. 

Discrete instruments and the weights for LATE

GED

Separability

Conclusion
Discrete instruments and the weights for LATE

Consider using $Z_1$ as instrument

- If $Z_1$ and $Z_2$ are negatively dependent and $E(Z_1 \mid P(Z) > u_D)$ is not monotonic in $u_D$, weights negative.

- This nonmonotonicity is evident in Figure 6B.

- This produces the pattern of negative weights shown in Figure 6A.

- Associated with two way flows.

- Two way flows are induced by uncontrolled variation in $Z_2$. 
Discrete instruments and the weights for LATE

**Figure 4B: monotonicity, the extended Roy economy**

Changing $Z_1$ without controlling for $Z_2$
**Discrete instruments and the weights for LATE**

**Figure 6: IV weights and its components under discrete instruments when $Z_1$ is the instrument**

The model is the same as the one presented after figure 4.
Discrete instruments and the weights for LATE

Figure 5C: IV weights and its components under discrete instruments when \( P(Z) \) is the instrument (local average treatment effects)
Discrete instruments and the weights for LATE

\[
\Delta_{Z_1}^{IV} = \sum_{\ell=1}^{K-1} \Delta^{LATE}(p_\ell, p_{\ell+1}) \lambda_\ell = 0.1833
\]

\[
\lambda_\ell = (p_{\ell+1} - p_\ell) \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} (z_{1,i} - E(Z_1)) \sum_{t>\ell} f(z_{1,i}, p_t)}{\text{Cov}(Z_1, D)}
\]
Discrete instruments and the weights for LATE

Joint probability distribution of \((Z_1, Z_2)\) and the propensity score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Z_1) (\backslash) (Z_2)</th>
<th>(-1)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(-1)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.7309</td>
<td>0.6402</td>
<td>0.5409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.6402</td>
<td>0.5409</td>
<td>0.4388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.5409</td>
<td>0.4388</td>
<td>0.3408</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\text{Cov}(Z_1, Z_2) = -0.5468
\]

(joint probabilities in ordinary type \((\Pr(Z_1 = z_1, Z_2 = z_2))\); propensity score in italics \((\Pr(D = 1|Z_1 = z_1, Z_2 = z_2))\))
Continuous instruments and the weights for LATE

Conditional variable estimator and conditional local average treatment effect when $Z_1$ is the instrument (given $Z_2 = z_2$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$Z_2 = -1$</th>
<th>$Z_2 = 0$</th>
<th>$Z_2 = 1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$P(-1, Z_2) = p_3$</td>
<td>0.7309</td>
<td>0.6402</td>
<td>0.5409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P(0, Z_2) = p_2$</td>
<td>0.6402</td>
<td>0.5409</td>
<td>0.4388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P(1, Z_2) = p_1$</td>
<td>0.5409</td>
<td>0.4388</td>
<td>0.3408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_1$</td>
<td>0.8418</td>
<td>0.5384</td>
<td>0.2860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_2$</td>
<td>0.1582</td>
<td>0.4616</td>
<td>0.7140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta_{LATE} (p_1, p_2)$</td>
<td>$-0.2475$</td>
<td>0.2497</td>
<td>0.7470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta_{LATE} (p_2, p_3)$</td>
<td>$-0.7448$</td>
<td>$-0.2475$</td>
<td>0.2497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta_{IV}^{IV} Z_1</td>
<td>Z_2 = z_2$</td>
<td>$-0.3262$</td>
<td>0.0202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discrete instruments and the weights for LATE

Conditional instrumental variable estimator

\[ \Delta_{IV}^{Z_2 = z_2} = \sum_{\ell=1}^{l-1} \Delta^{LATE}(p_{\ell}, p_{\ell+1} | Z_2 = z_2) \lambda_{\ell} | Z_2 = z_2 = \sum_{\ell=1}^{l-1} \Delta^{LATE}(p_{\ell}, p_{\ell+1} | Z_2 = z_2) \lambda_{\ell} | Z_2 = z_2 \]

\[ \Delta^{LATE}(p_{\ell}, p_{\ell+1} | Z_2 = z_2) = \frac{E(Y | P(Z) = p_{\ell+1}, Z_2 = z_2) - E(Y | P(Z) = p_{\ell}, Z_2 = z_2)}{p_{\ell+1} - p_{\ell}} \]

\[ \lambda_{\ell} | Z_2 = z_2 = (p_{\ell+1} - p_{\ell}) \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{l} (z_{1,i} - E(Z_1 | Z_2 = z_2)) \sum_{t>\ell} f(z_{1,i}, p_t | Z_2 = z_2)}{\text{Cov}(Z_1, D)} \]

\[ = (p_{\ell+1} - p_{\ell}) \frac{\sum_{t>\ell} (z_{1,t} - E(Z_1 | Z_2 = z_2)) f(z_{1,t}, p_t | Z_2 = z_2)}{\text{Cov}(Z_1, D)} \]
Discrete instruments and the weights for LATE

Conditional instrumental variable estimator

| $z_1$ | $\Pr(Z_1 = z_1|Z_2 = -1)$ | $\Pr(Z_1 = z_1|Z_2 = 0)$ | $\Pr(Z_1 = z_1|Z_2 = 1)$ |
|---|---|---|---|
| -1 | 0.0385 | 0.25 | 0.9 |
| 0  | 0.5769 | 0.125 | 0.075 |
| 1  | 0.3846 | 0.625 | 0.025 |
Figure 7 plots $E(Y \mid P(Z))$ and MTE for the models displayed at the base of the figure. In cases I and II, $\beta \perp \perp D$.

- In case I, this is trivial since $\beta$ is a constant. In case II, $\beta$ is random but selection into $D$ does not depend on $\beta$.
- Case III is the model with essential heterogeneity ($\beta \not\perp D$).
- Figure 7A depicts $E(Y \mid P(Z))$ in the three cases.
Figure 7 plots $E(Y \mid P(Z))$ and MTE for the models displayed at the base of the figure. In cases I and II, $\beta \perp \perp D$.

In case I, this is trivial since $\beta$ is a constant. In case II, $\beta$ is random but selection into $D$ does not depend on $\beta$.

Case III is the model with essential heterogeneity ($\beta \not\perp D$).

Figure 7A depicts $E(Y \mid P(Z))$ in the three cases.
Figure 7 plots $E(Y \mid P(Z))$ and MTE for the models displayed at the base of the figure. In cases I and II, $\beta \perp \perp D$.

In case I, this is trivial since $\beta$ is a constant. In case II, $\beta$ is random but selection into $D$ does not depend on $\beta$.

Case III is the model with essential heterogeneity ($\beta \not\perp \not\perp D$).

Figure 7A depicts $E(Y \mid P(Z))$ in the three cases.
Figure 7 plots $E(Y \mid P(Z))$ and MTE for the models displayed at the base of the figure. In cases I and II, $\beta \perp \perp D$.

In case I, this is trivial since $\beta$ is a constant. In case II, $\beta$ is random but selection into $D$ does not depend on $\beta$.

Case III is the model with essential heterogeneity ($\beta \not\perp D$).

Figure 7A depicts $E(Y \mid P(Z))$ in the three cases.
Figure 7: conditional expectation of $Y$ on $P(Z)$ and the marginal treatment effect (MTE)
Continuous instruments

Outcomes

\[ Y_1 = \alpha + \bar{\beta} + U_1 \]
\[ Y_0 = \alpha + U_0 \]

Choice Model

\[ D = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } D^* > 0 \\
0 & \text{if } D^* \leq 0
\end{cases} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case I</th>
<th>Case II</th>
<th>Case III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( U_1 = U_0 )</td>
<td>( U_1 - U_0 \perp D )</td>
<td>( U_1 - U_0 \not\perp D )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \bar{\beta} = \text{ATE} = \text{TT} = \text{TUT} = \text{IV} )</td>
<td>( \bar{\beta} = \text{ATE} = \text{TT} = \text{TUT} = \text{IV} )</td>
<td>( \bar{\beta} = \text{ATE} \not\equiv \text{TT} \not\equiv \text{TUT} \not\equiv \text{IV} )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Parameterization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases I, II and III</th>
<th>Cases II and III</th>
<th>Case III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha = 0.67 )</td>
<td>( (U_1, U_0) \sim N(0, \Sigma) ) ( \text{with } \Sigma = \begin{bmatrix} 1 &amp; -0.9 \ -0.9 &amp; 1 \end{bmatrix} )</td>
<td>( D^* = Y_1 - Y_0 - \gamma Z )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \bar{\beta} = 0.2 )</td>
<td></td>
<td>( Z \sim N(\mu_Z, \Sigma_Z) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \mu_Z = (2, -2) ) and ( \Sigma_Z = \begin{bmatrix} 9 &amp; -2 \ -2 &amp; 9 \end{bmatrix} )</td>
<td></td>
<td>( \gamma = (0.5, 0.5) )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cases I and II make $E(Y \mid P(Z))$ linear in $P(Z)$ (see equation 3.7). Case III is nonlinear in $P(Z)$ which arises when $\beta \not\perp D$. The derivative of $E(Y \mid P(Z))$ is presented in the right panel (Figure 7B).

It is a constant in cases I and II (flat MTE) but declining in $U_D = P(Z)$ for the case with selection on the gain.
Cases I and II make $E(Y \mid P(Z))$ linear in $P(Z)$ (see equation 3.7). Case III is nonlinear in $P(Z)$ which arises when $\beta \perp \not\perp D$. The derivative of $E(Y \mid P(Z))$ is presented in the right panel (Figure 7B).

It is a constant in cases I and II (flat MTE) but declining in $U_D = P(Z)$ for the case with selection on the gain.
MTE gives the mean marginal return for persons who have utility $P(Z) = u_D$ ($P(Z) = u_D$ is the margin of indifference).

Figure 7 highlights that MTE (and LATE) identify average returns for persons at the margin of indifference at different levels of the mean utility function $P(Z)$.

Figure 8 plots MTE and LATE for different intervals of $u_D$ using the model plotted in Figure 7.

LATE is the chord of $E(Y \mid P(Z))$ evaluated at different points.

The relationship between LATE and MTE is presented in the right panel of Figure 8.
Continuous instruments

- MTE gives the mean marginal return for persons who have utility $P(Z) = u_D$ ($P(Z) = u_D$ is the margin of indifference).

- Figure 7 highlights that MTE (and LATE) identify average returns for persons at the margin of indifference at different levels of the mean utility function $P(Z)$.

- Figure 8 plots MTE and LATE for different intervals of $u_D$ using the model plotted in Figure 7.

- LATE is the chord of $E(Y \mid P(Z))$ evaluated at different points.

- The relationship between LATE and MTE is presented in the right panel of Figure 8.
MTE gives the mean marginal return for persons who have utility $P(Z) = u_D$ ($P(Z) = u_D$ is the margin of indifference).

Figure 7 highlights that MTE (and LATE) identify average returns for persons at the margin of indifference at different levels of the mean utility function $P(Z)$.

Figure 8 plots MTE and LATE for different intervals of $u_D$ using the model plotted in Figure 7.

LATE is the chord of $E(Y | P(Z))$ evaluated at different points.

The relationship between LATE and MTE is presented in the right panel of Figure 8.
Continuous instruments

- MTE gives the mean marginal return for persons who have utility $P(Z) = u_D$ ($P(Z) = u_D$ is the margin of indifference).

- Figure 7 highlights that MTE (and LATE) identify average returns for persons at the margin of indifference at different levels of the mean utility function $P(Z)$.

- Figure 8 plots MTE and LATE for different intervals of $u_D$ using the model plotted in Figure 7.

- LATE is the chord of $E(Y \mid P(Z))$ evaluated at different points.

- The relationship between LATE and MTE is presented in the right panel of Figure 8.
Continuous instruments

- MTE gives the mean marginal return for persons who have utility $P(Z) = u_D$ ($P(Z) = u_D$ is the margin of indifference).

- Figure 7 highlights that MTE (and LATE) identify average returns for persons at the margin of indifference at different levels of the mean utility function $P(Z)$.

- Figure 8 plots MTE and LATE for different intervals of $u_D$ using the model plotted in Figure 7.

- LATE is the chord of $E(Y \mid P(Z))$ evaluated at different points.

- The relationship between LATE and MTE is presented in the right panel of Figure 8.
Continuous instruments

**Figure 8: the local average treatment effect**

A. \( E(Y|P(Z) = p) \) and \( \Delta^{\text{LATE}}(p_\ell, p_{\ell+1}) \)

B. \( \Delta^{\text{MTE}}(u_D) \) and \( \Delta^{\text{LATE}}(p_\ell, p_{\ell+1}) \)

\[
\text{Area}(A,B,C,D)/0.25 = \text{LATE}(0.1,0.35) = 1.719
\]

\[
\text{Area}(E,F,G,H)/0.3 = \text{LATE}(0.6,0.9) = -1.17
\]

\[
\text{LATE}(0.1,0.35) = 1.797
\]

\[
\text{LATE}(0.6,0.9) = -1.17
\]
Continuous instruments

**Figure 8: the local average treatment effect**

\[
\Delta^{LATE}(p_\ell, p_{\ell+1}) = \frac{E(Y|P(Z) = p_{\ell+1}) - E(Y|P(Z) = p_\ell)}{p_{\ell+1} - p_\ell}
\]

\[
= \frac{\int_{p_\ell}^{p_{\ell+1}} \Delta^{MTE}(u_D) \, du_D}{p_{\ell+1} - p_\ell}
\]

\[
\Delta^{LATE}(0.1, 0.35) = 1.719 \\
\Delta^{LATE}(0.6, 0.9) = -1.17
\]
Continuous instruments

**Figure 8: the local average treatment effect**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Choice Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Y_1 = \alpha + \bar{\beta} + U_1$</td>
<td>$D = \begin{cases} 1 &amp; \text{if } D^* &gt; 0 \ 0 &amp; \text{if } D^* \leq 0 \end{cases}$ with $D^* = Y_1 - Y_0 - \gamma Z$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_0 = \alpha + U_0$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Parameterization**

$\left(U_1, U_0\right) \sim N\left(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{\Sigma}\right)$ and $Z \sim N\left(\mu_Z, \mathbf{\Sigma}_Z\right)$

$\mathbf{\Sigma} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & -0.9 \\ -0.9 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$, $\mu_Z = (2, -2)$ and $\mathbf{\Sigma}_Z = \begin{bmatrix} 9 & -2 \\ -2 & 9 \end{bmatrix}$

$\alpha = 0.67, \bar{\beta} = 0.2, \gamma = (0.5, 0.5)$
Continuous instruments

- The treatment parameters as a function of $p$ associated with case III are plotted in Figure 9.

- MTE is the same as that reported in Figure 7.

- ATE is the same for all $p$.

- $\Delta^{TT}(p) = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D = 1, P(Z) = p)$ declines in $p$ (equivalently, it declines in $u_D$).

$$LATE(p, p') = \frac{\Delta^{TT}(p')p' - \Delta^{TT}(p)p}{p' - p}, \quad p' \neq p$$

$$MTE = \frac{\partial[\Delta^{TT}(p)p]}{\partial p}.$$
Continuous instruments

- The treatment parameters as a function of $p$ associated with case III are plotted in Figure 9.

- MTE is the same as that reported in Figure 7.

- ATE is the same for all $p$.

- $\Delta^{TT}(p) = E(Y_1 - Y_0 | D = 1, P(Z) = p)$ declines in $p$ (equivalently, it declines in $u_D$).

\[
LATE(p, p') = \frac{\Delta^{TT}(p')p' - \Delta^{TT}(p)p}{p' - p}, \quad p' \neq p
\]

\[
MTE = \frac{\partial[\Delta^{TT}(p)p]}{\partial p}.
\]
The treatment parameters as a function of $p$ associated with case III are plotted in Figure 9.

MTE is the same as that reported in Figure 7.

ATE is the same for all $p$.

$$\Delta^{TT}(p) = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D = 1, P(Z) = p)$$

(eqivalently, it declines in $u_D$).

$$LATE(p, p') = \frac{\Delta^{TT}(p')p' - \Delta^{TT}(p)p}{p' - p}, \quad p' \neq p$$

$$MTE = \frac{\partial[\Delta^{TT}(p)p]}{\partial p}.$$
The treatment parameters as a function of $p$ associated with case III are plotted in Figure 9.

MTE is the same as that reported in Figure 7.

ATE is the same for all $p$.

$\Delta^{TT}(p) = E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid D = 1, P(Z) = p)$ declines in $p$ (equivalently, it declines in $u_D$).

$$LATE(p, p') = \frac{\Delta^{TT}(p')p' - \Delta^{TT}(p)p}{p' - p}, \quad p' \neq p$$

$$MTE = \frac{\partial[\Delta^{TT}(p)p]}{\partial p}.$$
### Parameter Definition Under Assumptions (*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Under Assumptions (*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marginal Treatment Effect</td>
<td>$E[Y_1 - Y_0</td>
<td>D^* = 0, P(Z) = p]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Treatment Effect</td>
<td>$E[Y_1 - Y_0</td>
<td>P(Z) = p]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment on the Treated</td>
<td>$E[Y_1 - Y_0</td>
<td>D^* &gt; 0, P(Z) = p]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment on the Untreated</td>
<td>$E[Y_1 - Y_0</td>
<td>D^* \leq 0, P(Z) = p]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLS/Matching on $P(Z)$</td>
<td>$E[Y_1</td>
<td>D^* &gt; 0, P(Z) = p] - E[Y_0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $\Phi(\cdot)$ and $\phi(\cdot)$ represent the cdf and pdf of a standard normal distribution, respectively. $\Phi^{-1}(\cdot)$ represents the inverse of $\Phi(\cdot)$.

(*): The model in this case is the same as the one presented below Figure 6.
Continuous instruments

Figure 9: treatment parameters and OLS matching as a function of $P(Z) = p$
Another nonmonotonicity example

A mixture of two normals:

\[ Z \sim P_1 N(\mu_1, \Sigma_1) + P_2 N(\mu_2, \Sigma_2) \]

\( P_1 \) is the proportion in population 1, \( P_2 \) is the proportion in population 2 and \( P_1 + P_2 = 1 \).
Another nonmonotonicity example

- Conventional normal outcome selection model generated by the parameters at the base of Figure 11.

- The discrete choice equation is a conventional probit:
  \[ \Pr (D = 1 \mid Z = z) = \Phi \left( \frac{\gamma z}{\sigma_{V}} \right). \]

- The \( \Delta^{MTE}(v) \),
  \[ E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid V = v) = \mu_1 - \mu_0 + \frac{Cov(U_1 - U_0, V)}{Var(V)} v. \]

- We show results for models with vector \( Z \) that satisfies (IV-1) and (IV-2) and with \( \gamma > 0 \) componentwise.
Continuous instruments

Another nonmonotonicity example

- Conventional normal outcome selection model generated by the parameters at the base of Figure 11.

- The discrete choice equation is a conventional probit:
  \[ \Pr(D = 1 \mid Z = z) = \Phi \left( \frac{\gamma z}{\sigma_V} \right). \]

- The \( \Delta^{MTE}(v) \),
  \[ E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid V = v) = \mu_1 - \mu_0 + \frac{\text{Cov}(U_1 - U_0, V)}{\text{Var}(V)} v. \]

- We show results for models with vector \( Z \) that satisfies (IV-1) and (IV-2) and with \( \gamma > 0 \) componentwise.
**Another nonmonotonicity example**

- Conventional normal outcome selection model generated by the parameters at the base of Figure 11.

- The discrete choice equation is a conventional probit:
  \[ \Pr(D = 1 \mid Z = z) = \Phi \left( \frac{\gamma z}{\sigma_V} \right). \]

- The \( \Delta^{\text{MTE}}(v) \),
  \[
  E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid V = v) = \mu_1 - \mu_0 + \frac{\text{Cov}(U_1 - U_0, V)}{\text{Var}(V)} v.
  \]

- We show results for models with vector \( Z \) that satisfies (IV-1) and (IV-2) and with \( \gamma > 0 \) componentwise.
Another nonmonotonicity example

- Conventional normal outcome selection model generated by the parameters at the base of Figure 11.

- The discrete choice equation is a conventional probit:
  \[
  \Pr(D = 1 \mid Z = z) = \Phi \left( \frac{\gamma z}{\sigma_V} \right).
  \]

- The \(\Delta^{\text{MTE}}(v)\),
  \[
  E(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid V = v) = \mu_1 - \mu_0 + \frac{\text{Cov}(U_1 - U_0, V)}{\text{Var}(V)} v.
  \]

- We show results for models with vector \(Z\) that satisfies (IV-1) and (IV-2) and with \(\gamma > 0\) componentwise.
Continuous instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Choice Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Y_1 = \alpha + \bar{\beta} + U_1$</td>
<td>$D = \begin{cases} 1 &amp; \text{if } D^* &gt; 0 \ 0 &amp; \text{if } D^* \leq 0 \end{cases}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_0 = \alpha + U_0$</td>
<td>$D^* = Y_1 - Y_0 - \gamma Z$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and $V = -(U_1 - U_0)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Parameterization**

$(U_1, U_0) \sim N(\mathbf{0}, \Sigma), \quad \Sigma = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & -0.9 \\ -0.9 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \alpha = 0.67, \quad \bar{\beta} = 0.2$
Continuous instruments

\[ Z = (Z_1, Z_2) \sim p_1 N(\kappa_1, \Sigma_1) + p_2 N(\kappa_2, \Sigma_2) \]

\[ p_1 = 0.45, \quad p_2 = 0.55 \quad ; \quad \Sigma_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 1.4 & 0.5 \\ 0.5 & 1.4 \end{bmatrix} \]

\[ \text{Cov}(Z_1, \gamma Z) = \gamma \Sigma_1^1 = 0.98 \quad ; \quad \gamma = (0.2, 1.4) \]
Figure 11: marginal treatment effect and IV weights using $Z_1$ as the instrument when $Z = (Z_1, Z_2) \sim p_1 N(\mu_1, \Sigma_1) + p_2 N(\mu_2, \Sigma_2)$ for different values of $\Sigma_2$
Continuous instruments

**Table 3: IV estimator and Cov\((Z_2, \gamma'Z)\) associated with each value of \(\Sigma_2\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weights</th>
<th>(\Sigma_2)</th>
<th>(\kappa_1)</th>
<th>(\kappa_2)</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>ATE</th>
<th>TT</th>
<th>TUT</th>
<th>Cov((Z_2, \gamma Z) = \gamma \Sigma_2^1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| \(\omega_1\) | \[ 0.6  
-0.5 \] 
| 0.6  
-0.5 \] | \[ 0 0 \] 
| 0 0 \] | 0.434 | 0.2 | 1.401 | -1.175 | -0.58 |
| \(\omega_2\) | \[ 0.6  
0.1 \] 
| 0.1  
0.6 \] | \[ 0 0 \] 
| 0 0 \] | 0.078 | 0.2 | 1.378 | -1.145 | 0.26 |
| \(\omega_3\) | \[ 0.6  
-0.3 \] 
| -0.3  
0.6 \] | \[ 0 -1 \] 
| 0 1 \] | -2.261 | 0.2 | 1.310 | -0.859 | -0.30 |
Consider the study of the GED.
Figure 12: frequency of the propensity score by final schooling decision

Dropouts and GEDs – males of the NLSY at age 30
### Table 4: instrumental variables estimates

Sample of GEDs and dropouts – males at age 30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instruments</th>
<th>Full Sample (a)</th>
<th>Common Support (b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father Highest Grade Completed</td>
<td>0.194 (0.384)</td>
<td>0.005 (0.391)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother Highest Grade Completed</td>
<td>1.106 (3.030)</td>
<td>0.588 (2.981)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Siblings</td>
<td>-0.311 (0.618)</td>
<td>-0.471 (0.725)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ged Cost</td>
<td>1.938 (2.414)</td>
<td>1.994 (2.544)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income in 1979</td>
<td>0.656 (0.534)</td>
<td>0.636 (0.571)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropout's local wage at age 17</td>
<td>-1.812 (1.228)</td>
<td>-1.612 (1.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate's local wage at age 17</td>
<td>-2.197 (1.441)</td>
<td>-1.872 (1.143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropout's local unemployment rate at age 17</td>
<td>0.164 (1.071)</td>
<td>0.203 (0.853)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate's local unemployment rate at age 17</td>
<td>0.142 (1.537)</td>
<td>0.202 (1.261)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propensity Score (d)</td>
<td>-0.276 (0.134)</td>
<td>-0.305 (0.140)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (*) We excluded the oversample of poor whites, the military sample, and those who attended college. The cost of the GED corresponds to the average testing fee per GED battery by state among 1993 and 2000 (Source: GED Statistical Report). Average local wage for dropouts and high school graduates correspond to the average blue-collar wages in the state of residence for each group respectively, and local unemployment rate corresponds to the unemployment rate in the county of residence.

Average local wages, local unemployment rates, mother's and father's education all refer the level at age 17.

(a) The IV estimates and the standard deviations (in parenthesis) are computed applying the traditional formulae to the full sample. The number of observations in our sample is 780.

(b) The IV estimates and the standard deviations (in parenthesis) are computed applying the traditional formulae to the common support sample. This sample contains only observations for which the estimated propensity score belongs to the common support of the propensity score between the control (dropouts) and treatment group (GEDs). The number of observations in our sample is 756.

(c) The treatment parameters are estimated by taking the weighted sum of the MTE estimated using the parametric approach.

d) The treatment parameters are estimated by taking the weighted sum of the MTE estimated using a polynomial of degree 4 to approximate $E(Y|P)$.

(e) The treatment parameters are estimated by taking the weighted sum of the MTE estimated using the nonparametric approach. In (c), (d) and (e), the standard deviations (in parenthesis) are computed using bootstrapping (100 draws).
The dependent variable in the outcome equation is hourly earnings at age 30. The controls in the outcome equations are tenure, tenure squared, experience, corrected AFQT, black (dummy), hispanic (dummy), marital status, and years of schooling. Let $D=0$ denote dropout status, and $D=1$ denote GED status. The model for $D$ (choice model) includes as controls the corrected AFQT, number of siblings, father’s education, mother’s education, family income at age 17, local GED costs, broken home at age 14, average local wage at age 17 for dropouts and high school graduates, local unemployment rate at age 17 for dropouts and high school graduates, the dummy variables black and hispanics, and a set of dummy variables controlling for the year of birth. The choice model is estimated using a probit model. In computing the MTE, the bandwidth in the first step is selected using the leave-one-out cross-validation method. In the second step, following Carneiro (2003) and Heckman et.al. (1998), we set the bandwidth to 0.3. We use biweight kernel functions.
The dependent variable in the outcome equation is hourly earnings at age 30. The controls in the outcome equations are tenure, tenure squared, experience, corrected AFQT, black (dummy), hispanic (dummy), marital status, and years of schooling. Let $D=0$ denote dropout status, and $D=1$ denote GED status. The model for $D$ (choice model) includes as controls the corrected AFQT, number of siblings, father’s education, mother’s education, family income at age 17, local GED costs, broken home at age 14, average local wage at age 17 for dropouts and high school graduates, local unemployment rate at age 17 for dropouts and high school graduates, the dummy variables black and hispanics, and a set of dummy variables controlling for the year of birth. The choice model is estimated using a probit model. In computing the MTE, the bandwidth in the first step is selected using the leave-one-out cross-validation method. In the second step, following Carneiro (2003) and Heckman et al. (1998), we set the bandwidth to 0.3. We use biweight kernel functions.
The dependent variable in the outcome equation is hourly earnings at age 30. The controls in the outcome equations are tenure, tenure squared, experience, corrected AFQT, black (dummy), Hispanic (dummy), marital status, and years of schooling. Let $D=0$ denote dropout status, and $D=1$ denote GED status. The model for $D$ (choice model) includes as controls the corrected AFQT, number of siblings, father’s education, mother’s education, family income at age 17, local GED costs, broken home at age 14, average local wage at age 17 for dropouts and high school graduates, local unemployment rate at age 17 for dropouts and high school graduates, the dummy variables black and hispanics, and a set of dummy variables controlling for the year of birth. The choice model is estimated using a probit model. In computing the MTE, the bandwidth in the first step is selected using the leave-one-out cross-validation method. In the second step, following Carneiro (2003) and Heckman et al. (1998), we set the bandwidth to 0.3. We use biweight kernel functions.
### Table 5: treatment parameter estimates

Sample of GED and Dropouts - Males at age 30 \(^{(a)}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment Parameter</th>
<th>Parametric (^{(b)})</th>
<th>Polynomial (^{(c)})</th>
<th>Nonparametric (^{(d)})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment on the Treated</td>
<td>-0.152 (0.166)</td>
<td>-0.183 (0.201)</td>
<td>-0.241 (0.180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment on the Untreated</td>
<td>-0.369 (0.170)</td>
<td>-0.119 (0.231)</td>
<td>-0.304 (0.223)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Treatment Effect</td>
<td>-0.279 (0.151)</td>
<td>-0.145 (0.184)</td>
<td>-0.278 (0.174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATE(0.38,0.62)</td>
<td>-0.335 (0.160)</td>
<td>-0.404 (0.275)</td>
<td>-0.261 (0.221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATE(0.55,0.79)</td>
<td>-0.453 (0.205)</td>
<td>0.106 (0.377)</td>
<td>-0.327 (0.416)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATE(0.21,0.45)</td>
<td>-0.216 (0.153)</td>
<td>-0.462 (0.210)</td>
<td>-0.396 (0.164)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) We excluded the oversample of poor whites, the military sample, and those who attended college. (b) The treatment parameters are estimated by taking the weighted sum of the MTE estimated using the parametric approach. (c) The treatment parameters are estimated by taking the weighted sum of the MTE estimated using A polynomial of degree 4 to approximate E(Y\(\mid\)P). (d) The treatment parameters are estimated by taking the weighted sum of the MTE estimated using the nonparametric approach. The standard deviations (in parenthesis) are computed using bootstrapping (100 draws).
Relaxing additive separability in the choice equation and allowing for random coefficient choice models

- The analysis of this lecture and the entire recent literature on instrumental variables estimators for models with essential heterogeneity relies on the assumption that the treatment choice equation is in additively separable form (3.2).

- Imparts an asymmetry to the entire instrumental variable enterprise for estimating treatment effects.
Relaxing additive separability in the choice equation and allowing for random coefficient choice models

- The analysis of this lecture and the entire recent literature on instrumental variables estimators for models with essential heterogeneity relies on the assumption that the treatment choice equation is in additively separable form (3.2).

- Imparts an asymmetry to the entire instrumental variable enterprise for estimating treatment effects.
Relaxing additive separability in the choice equation and allowing for random coefficient choice models

- This asymmetry is also present in conventional selection models even in their semiparametric version.
- Parameters can be defined as weighted averages of an MTE but MTE and the derived parameters cannot be identified using any instrumental variables strategy.
Relaxing additive separability in the choice equation and allowing for random coefficient choice models

- This asymmetry is also present in conventional selection models even in their semiparametric version.

- Parameters can be defined as weighted averages of an MTE but MTE and the derived parameters cannot be identified using any instrumental variables strategy.
Relaxing additive separability in the choice equation and allowing for random coefficient choice models

- **Natural benchmark nonseparable model:**
  - random coefficient model of choice \( D = 1(\gamma Z \geq 0) \)
  - \( \gamma \) is a random coefficient vector and \( \gamma \perp (Z, U_0, U_1) \).
Relaxing additive separability in the choice equation and allowing for random coefficient choice models

- Natural benchmark nonseparable model:
  - random coefficient model of choice $D = 1 (\gamma Z \geq 0)$
  - $\gamma$ is a random coefficient vector and $\gamma \perp (Z, U_0, U_1)$.
Relaxing additive separability in the choice equation and allowing for random coefficient choice models

Natural benchmark nonseparable model:

- random coefficient model of choice \( D = 1 (\gamma Z \geq 0) \)
- \( \gamma \) is a random coefficient vector and \( \gamma \perp (Z, U_0, U_1) \).
Relaxing additive separability in the choice equation and allowing for random coefficient choice models

- Consider a more general case.
- Relax the separability assumption of equation (3.2).

\[ D^* = \mu_D (Z, V), \quad D = 1(D^* \geq 0), \quad (7.1) \]

\( \mu_D (Z, V) \) is not necessarily additively separable in \( Z \) and \( V \), and \( V \) is not necessarily a scalar.
Relaxing additive separability in the choice equation and allowing for random coefficient choice models

- Consider a more general case.
- Relax the separability assumption of equation (3.2).

\[ D^* = \mu_D(Z, V), \quad D = 1(D^* \geq 0), \quad (7.1) \]

\( \mu_D(Z, V) \) is not necessarily additively separable in \( Z \) and \( V \), and \( V \) is not necessarily a scalar.
Relaxing additive separability in the choice equation and allowing for random coefficient choice models

We maintain assumptions (A-1)–(A-2) and (A-5).

- As we have shown, relationships among treatment parameters as weighted averages of generator functions (not MTEs) hold in this case even if we fail monotonicity.
Figure 4C: monotonicity, the extended Roy economy
Random coefficient case
Figure 4C: monotonicity, the extended Roy economy
Random coefficient case

\[ z \longrightarrow z' \]

\[ z = (0, 1) \text{ and } z' = (1, 1) \]

\[ \gamma \text{ is a random vector} \]

\[ \tilde{\gamma} = (0.5, 0.5) \text{ and } \widetilde{\gamma} = (-0.5, 0.5) \]

where \( \tilde{\gamma} \) and \( \widetilde{\gamma} \) are two realizations of \( \gamma \)

\[ D (\tilde{\gamma} z) \geq D (\widetilde{\gamma} z') \text{ and } D (\tilde{\gamma} z) < D (\widetilde{\gamma} z') \]

Depending on value of \( \gamma \)
In the additively separable case, MTE has three equivalent interpretations:

1. $U_D(= F_V(V))$ is the only unobservable in the first stage decision rule, and MTE is the average effect of treatment given the unobserved characteristics in the decision rule ($U_D = u_D$);

2. MTE is the average effect of treatment given that the individual would be indifferent between treatment or not if $P(Z) = u_D$, where $P(Z)$ is a mean utility function;

3. the MTE is an average effect conditional on the additive error term from the first stage choice model.
Relaxing additive separability in the choice equation and allowing for random coefficient choice models

- In the additively separable case, MTE has three equivalent interpretations:
  1. $U_D(= F_V(V))$ is the only unobservable in the first stage decision rule, and MTE is the average effect of treatment given the unobserved characteristics in the decision rule ($U_D = u_D$);
  2. MTE is the average effect of treatment given that the individual would be indifferent between treatment or not if $P(Z) = u_D$, where $P(Z)$ is a mean utility function;
  3. the MTE is an average effect conditional on the additive error term from the first stage choice model.
In the additively separable case, MTE has three equivalent interpretations:

1. \( U_D(= F_V(V)) \) is the only unobservable in the first stage decision rule, and MTE is the average effect of treatment given the unobserved characteristics in the decision rule \( U_D = u_D \);

2. MTE is the average effect of treatment given that the individual would be indifferent between treatment or not if \( P(Z) = u_D \), where \( P(Z) \) is a mean utility function;

3. the MTE is an average effect conditional on the additive error term from the first stage choice model.
Relaxing additive separability in the choice equation and allowing for random coefficient choice models

- In the additively separable case, MTE has three equivalent interpretations:
  1. $U_D(= F_V(V))$ is the only unobservable in the first stage decision rule, and MTE is the average effect of treatment given the unobserved characteristics in the decision rule ($U_D = u_D$);
  2. MTE is the average effect of treatment given that the individual would be indifferent between treatment or not if $P(Z) = u_D$, where $P(Z)$ is a mean utility function;
  3. the MTE is an average effect conditional on the additive error term from the first stage choice model.
Relaxing additive separability in the choice equation and allowing for random coefficient choice models

- Under all interpretations of the MTE, and under the assumptions (A-1)–(A-5), MTE can be identified by LIV.

- Three definitions are not the same in the general nonseparable case (7.1). Heckman and Vytlacil (2001, 2005) extend MTE to the nonseparable case.
Relaxing additive separability in the choice equation and allowing for random coefficient choice models

- Under all interpretations of the MTE, and under the assumptions (A-1)–(A-5), MTE can be identified by LIV.

- Three definitions are not the same in the general nonseparable case (7.1). Heckman and Vytlacil (2001, 2005) extend MTE to the nonseparable case.
For any version of the nonseparable model, index sufficiency fails.

Define $\Omega (z) = \{ \nu : \mu_D (z, \nu) \geq 0 \}$.

In the additively separable case, $P (z) \equiv \Pr (D = 1 \mid Z = z) = \Pr (V_D \in \Omega (z))$, $P (z) = P (z') \iff \Omega (z) = \Omega (z')$. 
For any version of the nonseparable model, index sufficiency fails.

Define $\Omega (z) = \{ v : \mu_D (z, v) \geq 0 \}$.

In the additively separable case, $P(z) \equiv \Pr (D = 1 \mid Z = z) = \Pr (V_D \in \Omega (z)), P(z) = P(z') \iff \Omega (z) = \Omega (z')$. 
For any version of the nonseparable model, index sufficiency fails.

Define $\Omega (z) = \{ v : \mu_D (z, v) \geq 0 \}$.

In the additively separable case, $P (z) \equiv \Pr (D = 1 \mid Z = z) = \Pr (V_D \in \Omega (z))$, $P (z) = P (z') \iff \Omega (z) = \Omega (z')$. 
This produces index sufficiency so the propensity score orders the unobservables generating choices.

In the more general case (7.1), it is possible to have \((z, z')\) values such that \(P(z) = P(z')\) and \(\Omega(z) \neq \Omega(z')\) so index sufficiency does not hold.

The \(Z\)'s enter the model more generally, and the propensity score no longer plays the central role it plays in separable models.
This produces index sufficiency so the propensity score orders the unobservables generating choices.

In the more general case (7.1), it is possible to have \((z, z')\) values such that \(P(z) = P(z')\) and \(\Omega(z) \neq \Omega(z')\) so index sufficiency does not hold.

The \(Z\)'s enter the model more generally, and the propensity score no longer plays the central role it plays in separable models.
This produces index sufficiency so the propensity score orders the unobservables generating choices.

In the more general case (7.1), it is possible to have \((z, z')\) values such that \(P(z) = P(z')\) and \(\Omega(z) \neq \Omega(z')\) so index sufficiency does not hold.

The \(Z\)'s enter the model more generally, and the propensity score no longer plays the central role it plays in separable models.
The nonseparable model can also restrict the support of $P(Z)$.

For example, consider a normal random coefficient choice model with a scalar regressor ($Z = (1, Z_1)$).

Assume $\gamma_0 \sim N(0, \sigma_0^2)$, $\gamma_1 \sim N(\bar{\gamma}_1, \sigma_1^2)$, and $\gamma_0 \perp \perp \gamma_1$.

$$P(z_1) = \Phi \left( \frac{\bar{\gamma}_1 z_1}{\sqrt{\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_1^2 z_1^2}} \right).$$

$\Phi$ is the cumulative distribution of a standard normal.

$\sigma_1^2 > 0$. 

$\Phi$ is the cumulative distribution of a standard normal.
The nonseparable model can also restrict the support of \( P (Z) \).

For example, consider a normal random coefficient choice model with a scalar regressor \((Z = (1, Z_1))\).

Assume \( \gamma_0 \sim N (0, \sigma_0^2) \), \( \gamma_1 \sim N (\bar{\gamma}_1, \sigma_1^2) \), and \( \gamma_0 \perp \perp \gamma_1 \).

\[
P (z_1) = \Phi \left( \frac{\bar{\gamma}_1 z_1}{\sqrt{\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_1^2 z_1^2}} \right).
\]

\( \Phi \) is the cumulative distribution of a standard normal.

\( \sigma_1^2 > 0 \).
The nonseparable model can also restrict the support of $P(Z)$.

For example, consider a normal random coefficient choice model with a scalar regressor ($Z = (1, Z_1)$).

Assume $\gamma_0 \sim N(0, \sigma_0^2)$, $\gamma_1 \sim N(\bar{\gamma}_1, \sigma_1^2)$, and $\gamma_0 \perp \perp \gamma_1$.

$$P(z_1) = \Phi \left( \frac{\bar{\gamma}_1 z_1}{\sqrt{\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_1^2 z_1^2}} \right).$$

$\Phi$ is the cumulative distribution of a standard normal.

$\sigma_1^2 > 0$. 
The nonseparable model can also restrict the support of $P(Z)$.

For example, consider a normal random coefficient choice model with a scalar regressor $(Z = (1, Z_1))$. 

Assume $\gamma_0 \sim N(0, \sigma_0^2)$, $\gamma_1 \sim N(\bar{\gamma}_1, \sigma_1^2)$, and $\gamma_0 \perp \perp \gamma_1$.

$$P(Z_1) = \Phi \left( \frac{\bar{\gamma}_1 Z_1}{\sqrt{\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_1^2 Z_1^2}} \right).$$

$\Phi$ is the cumulative distribution of a standard normal.

$\sigma_1^2 > 0$. 

$\Phi$ is the cumulative distribution of a standard normal.
The nonseparable model can also restrict the support of $P(Z)$.

For example, consider a normal random coefficient choice model with a scalar regressor $(Z = (1, Z_1))$.

Assume $\gamma_0 \sim N(0, \sigma_0^2)$, $\gamma_1 \sim N(\tilde{\gamma}_1, \sigma_1^2)$, and $\gamma_0 \perp \gamma_1$.

$$P(z_1) = \Phi \left( \frac{\tilde{\gamma}_1 z_1}{\sqrt{\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_1^2 z_1^2}} \right).$$

$\Phi$ is the cumulative distribution of a standard normal.

$\sigma_1^2 > 0$. 

$\Phi$ is the cumulative distribution of a standard normal.
The support of the propensity score

- The support is strictly within the unit interval.
- The case when $\sigma_0^2 = 0$, the support is one point,
  $$P(z) = \Phi \left( \frac{\gamma_1}{\sigma_1} \right).$$
- Cannot, in general, identify ATE, TT or any treatment effect requiring the endpoints 0 or 1 using IV or control function strategies.
The support of the propensity score

- The support is strictly within the unit interval.
- The case when $\sigma_0^2 = 0$, the support is one point,

\[ P(z) = \Phi \left( \frac{\gamma_1}{\sigma_1} \right). \]

- Cannot, in general, identify ATE, TT or any treatment effect requiring the endpoints 0 or 1 using IV or control function strategies.
The support is strictly within the unit interval.

The case when $\sigma_0^2 = 0$, the support is one point,

$$P(z) = \Phi \left( \frac{\gamma_1}{\sigma_1} \right).$$

Cannot, in general, identify ATE, TT or any treatment effect requiring the endpoints 0 or 1 using IV or control function strategies.
Violations of uniformity

- One source of violations of monotonicity is nonseparability between $Z$ and $V$ in (7.1).

- The random coefficient model is one intuitive model where separability fails.

- Even if (7.1) is separable in $Z$ and $V$, uniformity may fail in the case of vector $Z$, where we use only one function of $Z$ as the instrument, and do not condition on the remaining sources of variation in $Z$.

- If we condition appropriately, we retain monotonicity but get a new form of instrumental variable estimator that is sensitive to the specification of the $Z$ not used as an instrument.
One source of violations of monotonicity is nonseparability between $Z$ and $V$ in (7.1).

The random coefficient model is one intuitive model where separability fails.

Even if (7.1) is separable in $Z$ and $V$, uniformity may fail in the case of vector $Z$, where we use only one function of $Z$ as the instrument, and do not condition on the remaining sources of variation in $Z$.

If we condition appropriately, we retain monotonicity but get a new form of instrumental variable estimator that is sensitive to the specification of the $Z$ not used as an instrument.
One source of violations of monotonicity is nonseparability between $Z$ and $V$ in (7.1).

The random coefficient model is one intuitive model where separability fails.

Even if (7.1) is separable in $Z$ and $V$, uniformity may fail in the case of vector $Z$, where we use only one function of $Z$ as the instrument, and do not condition on the remaining sources of variation in $Z$.

If we condition appropriately, we retain monotonicity but get a new form of instrumental variable estimator that is sensitive to the specification of the $Z$ not used as an instrument.
Violations of uniformity

- One source of violations of monotonicity is nonseparability between $Z$ and $V$ in (7.1).

- The random coefficient model is one intuitive model where separability fails.

- Even if (7.1) is separable in $Z$ and $V$, uniformity may fail in the case of vector $Z$, where we use only one function of $Z$ as the instrument, and do not condition on the remaining sources of variation in $Z$.

- If we condition appropriately, we retain monotonicity but get a new form of instrumental variable estimator that is sensitive to the specification of the $Z$ not used as an instrument.
Summary and conclusion

- We have studied the estimation of treatment effects in a model
  \[ Y = \alpha + \beta D + \varepsilon \]
- We have contrasted this with a structural Roy model.
- Considered cases where \( \beta \) is constant and where \( \beta \) is heterogeneous.
- In the heterogeneous case \( D \not\perp \varepsilon; \beta \not\perp D; \beta \not\perp \varepsilon \).
Summary and conclusion

- We have studied the estimation of treatment effects in a model
  \[ Y = \alpha + \beta D + \varepsilon \]
- We have contrasted this with a structural Roy model.
- Considered cases where \( \beta \) is constant and where \( \beta \) is heterogeneous.
- In the heterogeneous case \( D \perp \varepsilon; \beta \perp D; \beta \perp \varepsilon \).
Summary and conclusion

- We have studied the estimation of treatment effects in a model

\[ Y = \alpha + \beta D + \varepsilon \]

- We have contrasted this with a structural Roy model.

- Considered cases where \( \beta \) is constant and where \( \beta \) is heterogeneous.

- In the heterogeneous case \( D \not\perp \varepsilon; \beta \not\perp D; \beta \not\perp \varepsilon. \)
Summary and conclusion

- We have studied the estimation of treatment effects in a model
  \[ Y = \alpha + \beta D + \varepsilon \]
- We have contrasted this with a structural Roy model.
- Considered cases where \( \beta \) is constant and where \( \beta \) is heterogeneous.
- In the heterogeneous case \( D \not\perp \varepsilon; \beta \not\perp D; \beta \not\perp \varepsilon \).
Summary and conclusion


- In general heterogeneous response models, the two approaches have strong similarities.

- Selection models identify levels (conditional means).

- IV models identify slopes.
Summary and conclusion

- In general heterogeneous response models, the two approaches have strong similarities.
  - Selection models identify levels (conditional means).
  - IV models identify slopes.
Summary and conclusion


- In general heterogeneous response models, the two approaches have strong similarities.

- Selection models identify levels (conditional means).

- IV models identify slopes.

In general heterogeneous response models, the two approaches have strong similarities.

Selection models identify levels (conditional means).

IV models identify slopes.
Summary and conclusion

- We lose constants in estimating IV models.
- We get back level parameters by integration.
- This accounts for the weighting schemes that appear in the literature.
- We must recover the constants to get levels parameters. (Classical treatment effects like ATE and TT).
- We restore the constants to estimate classical treatment parameters using the same limit arguments used to identify selection models.
Summary and conclusion

- We lose constants in estimating IV models.
- We get back level parameters by integration.
- This accounts for the weighting schemes that appear in the literature.
- We must recover the constants to get levels parameters. (Classical treatment effects like ATE and TT).
- We restore the constants to estimate classical treatment parameters using the same limit arguments used to identify selection models.
Summary and conclusion

- We lose constants in estimating IV models.
- We get back level parameters by integration.
- This accounts for the weighting schemes that appear in the literature.
- We must recover the constants to get levels parameters. (Classical treatment effects like ATE and TT).
- We restore the constants to estimate classical treatment parameters using the same limit arguments used to identify selection models.
Summary and conclusion

- We lose constants in estimating IV models.
- We get back level parameters by integration.
- This accounts for the weighting schemes that appear in the literature.
- We must recover the constants to get levels parameters. (Classical treatment effects like ATE and TT).
- We restore the constants to estimate classical treatment parameters using the same limit arguments used to identify selection models.
Summary and conclusion

- We lose constants in estimating IV models.
- We get back level parameters by integration.
- This accounts for the weighting schemes that appear in the literature.
- We must recover the constants to get levels parameters. (Classical treatment effects like ATE and TT).
- We restore the constants to estimate classical treatment parameters using the same limit arguments used to identify selection models.
If we are only concerned with slope treatment parameters, we can avoid limit arguments in IV or selection models.

Explore the role of “monotonicity” or “uniformity” assumptions in IV.

Concept used by Imbens and Angrist (1994) to define LATE.

Monotonicity is not needed to define treatment parameters or establish the relationship among them (Heckman and Vytlacil).

Under monotonicity or uniformity, $\text{LIV} = \text{MTE}$. 
Summary and conclusion

- If we are only concerned with slope treatment parameters, we can avoid limit arguments in IV or selection models.

- Explore the role of “monotonicity” or “uniformity” assumptions in IV.

- Concept used by Imbens and Angrist (1994) to define LATE.

- Monotonicity is not needed to define treatment parameters or establish the relationship among them (Heckman and Vytlacil).

- Under monotonicity or uniformity, LIV = MTE.
Summary and conclusion

- If we are only concerned with slope treatment parameters, we can avoid limit arguments in IV or selection models.

- Explore the role of “monotonicity” or “uniformity” assumptions in IV.

- Concept used by Imbens and Angrist (1994) to define LATE.

- Monotonicity is not needed to define treatment parameters or establish the relationship among them (Heckman and Vytlacil).

- Under monotonicity or uniformity, $LIV = MTE$. 
Summary and conclusion

- If we are only concerned with slope treatment parameters, we can avoid limit arguments in IV or selection models.

- Explore the role of “monotonicity” or “uniformity” assumptions in IV.

- Concept used by Imbens and Angrist (1994) to define LATE.

- Monotonicity is not needed to define treatment parameters or establish the relationship among them (Heckman and Vytlacil).

- Under monotonicity or uniformity, LIV = MTE.
Summary and conclusion

- If we are only concerned with slope treatment parameters, we can avoid limit arguments in IV or selection models.

- Explore the role of “monotonicity” or “uniformity” assumptions in IV.

- Concept used by Imbens and Angrist (1994) to define LATE.

- Monotonicity is not needed to define treatment parameters or establish the relationship among them (Heckman and Vytlacil).

- Under monotonicity or uniformity, $LIV = MTE$. 
Summary and conclusion

- Can express all classical treatment parameters as weighted averages of MTE.
- Monotonicity is needed to use IV to identify MTE and LATE.
- Treatment parameters can be defined; relationships among them established and IV weights defined without monotonicity or uniformity.
Summary and conclusion

- Can express all classical treatment parameters as weighted averages of MTE.

- Monotonicity is needed to use IV to identify MTE and LATE.

- Treatment parameters can be defined; relationships among them established and IV weights defined without monotonicity or uniformity.
Summary and conclusion

- Can express all classical treatment parameters as weighted averages of MTE.

- Monotonicity is needed to use IV to identify MTE and LATE.

- Treatment parameters can be defined; relationships among them established and IV weights defined without monotonicity or uniformity.
Summary and conclusion

- Much of the literature is for two outcome models.
- Angrist and Imbens (1995) consider the case of an ordered choice model with a scalar instrument that affects choices at all margins.
- We develop the case of a general ordered choice model with transition-specific instruments.
- We also develop a general unordered model.
- The most general case requires a marriage of semiparametric selection models (e.g. Heckman, 1990) and IV intuition to identify general parameters.
Summary and conclusion

- Much of the literature is for two outcome models.

- Angrist and Imbens (1995) consider the case of an ordered choice model with a scalar instrument that affects choices at all margins.

- We develop the case of a general ordered choice model with transition-specific instruments.

- We also develop a general unordered model.

- The most general case requires a marriage of semiparametric selection models (e.g. Heckman, 1990) and IV intuition to identify general parameters.
Summary and conclusion

- Much of the literature is for two outcome models.
- Angrist and Imbens (1995) consider the case of an ordered choice model with a scalar instrument that affects choices at all margins.
- We develop the case of a general ordered choice model with transition-specific instruments.
- We also develop a general unordered model.
- The most general case requires a marriage of semiparametric selection models (e.g. Heckman, 1990) and IV intuition to identify general parameters.
Summary and conclusion

- Much of the literature is for two outcome models.

- Angrist and Imbens (1995) consider the case of an ordered choice model with a scalar instrument that affects choices at all margins.

- We develop the case of a general ordered choice model with transition-specific instruments.

- We also develop a general unordered model.

- The most general case requires a marriage of semiparametric selection models (e.g. Heckman, 1990) and IV intuition to identify general parameters.
Summary and conclusion

- Much of the literature is for two outcome models.
- Angrist and Imbens (1995) consider the case of an ordered choice model with a scalar instrument that affects choices at all margins.
- We develop the case of a general ordered choice model with transition-specific instruments.
- We also develop a general unordered model.
- The most general case requires a marriage of semiparametric selection models (e.g. Heckman, 1990) and IV intuition to identify general parameters.
Summary and conclusion

- Need to identify semiparametric discrete choice models to get classical pairwise properties.
- We have an analysis for bounds which we defer to another occasion.
Summary and conclusion

- Need to identify semiparametric discrete choice models to get classical pairwise properties.

- We have an analysis for bounds which we defer to another occasion.